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I. INTRODUCTION
Virtual currencies have emerged as an innovative technological alternative
for a multitude of tools and processes used by financial institutions, private
businesses, and investors.' However, contrary to popular belief, the term
"virtual currency" encompasses many distinct, independently developed
applications of Distributed Ledger Technology ("DLT").2 Moreover, the
term "cryptocurrency" describesjust one subsect of virtual currencies, which
itself includes a vast array of different technologies with unique
implementations, technological underpinnings, and end-uses.3 Consumers
*Junior Staff Member, American University Business Law Review, Volume 8; J.D.
Candidate, American University Washington College of Law 2020. B.A. in International
Affairs, George Washington University 2015.
1.See Antoine Bouveret & Vikran Haksar, What Are Cryptocurrencies?, 55 INT'L
MONETARY FuND FIN. & DEV. MAG. 26, 26-27 (June 2018), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/what-are-cryptocurrencies-like-
bitcoin/basics.pdf- see also In re Griffin Trading Co., 683 F.3d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2012)
(noting that the Euro initially operated only as a virtual currency) (internal citation
omitted).
2. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, KEY DEFINITION AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT
RISKS 4 (2014) (defining "virtual currency") [hereinafter KEY DEFINITIONS]; see also
infra Section II.A (discussing key distinctions between networks and explaining DLT).
3. See Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
cryptocurrency.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
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can already use one prominent virtual currency, Bitcoin, to make online
purchases from a variety of popular online retailers, travel-booking sites, and
even dating sites, with many others currently testing virtual currency
payment-processing systems. 4
As virtual currencies continue to gain popularity, major financial
institutions are working with developers to further broaden the variety of
financial tools and investment vehicles based on blockchain networks.'
Foreseeably, a major question arose soon after individual investors began to
speculate on virtual currency prices: how will they be regulated?' Though
United States ("U.S.") federal courts and agencies are struggling to establish
clear, definitive oversight of these digital assets, securities and commodities
regulators have flexed their self-asserted regulatory muscle by bringing
successful actions against developers.' In one such action, Commodity
Futures Trading Comm 'n v. McDonnell,' a federal court held for the first
time that all virtual currencies are commodities, which are subject to the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission's ("CFTC") jurisdiction. 9
Part II of this Comment defines key terms and underscores that many
virtual currencies are designed for drastically different purposes with highly
distinct technological protocols. Part III discusses notable efforts by federal
authorities to expand regulatory jurisdiction to virtual currencies, the sources
of law they rely upon in doing so, and their successes in federal court thus
far. Part IV analyzes the primary legal and practical issues with broadly
classifying all virtual currencies as commodities, and Part V underscores the
significant flaws in the McDonnell court's reasoning in doing so. Part VI
briefly analyzes the applicability of U.S. securities laws to virtual currencies
and related investment offerings. Lastly, Part VII recommends that (1)
4. Steve Fiorillo, How to Use Bitcoin for Purchases, THE STREET (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.thestreet.com/investing/bitcoin/what-can-you-buy-with-bitcoin- 14556706
(discussing Bitcoin payments on sites like Overstock, Expedia, and OKCupid).
5. See Rakesh Sharma, A Cryptocurrency Derivatives Boom Might Be On Its Way,
INVESTOPEDIA (May 1, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/tech/cryptocurrency-
derivatives-boom-might-be-its-way/.
6. See generally Kate Rooney, Your Guide to Cryptocurrency Regulations Around
the World and Where They Are Headed, CNBC (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/03/27/a-complete-guide-to-cyprocurrency-regulations-around-the-world.html
(describing various regulations on the validity of bitcoin and policies on exchanges in
different countries).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Mansy, 2:15-CR-198-GZS, 2017 WL 9672554 (D. Me.
May 11, 2017); United States v. Budovsky, 13CR00368, 2016 WL 386133 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 2016).
8. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).
9. Id. at 229-30.
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future case law resolve outstanding legal issues relevant to virtual currency
classification and narrow the holding in McDonnell, and (2) that regulators
develop a more precise regulatory scheme that accounts for the significant
differences between individual virtual currency networks.
II. VIRTUAL CURRENCIES - IN GENERAL
Understanding key terms, technological distinctions between individual
networks, and current efforts by U.S. regulators is essential to implementing
a precise and effective classification mechanism for virtual currency
regulation.
A. What Are Virtual Currencies?
The terms "virtual currency," "cryptocurrency," and "tokens," inter alia,
each refer to individual aspects of entirely distinct networks, which
themselves are specific applications of a broader system known as
"blockchain technology," or simply "the blockchain."o Moreover, the
blockchain is just one particular application of DLT for the narrow purpose
of peer-to-peer information transfer through decentralized online networks."
DLT is essentially a "consensus validation system" designed to replace
centralized validation authorities with distributed ledgers, which exist across
several online nodes - mainly computers - and maintain identical copies
of user transactions to validate them in the future.12
Rather unintuitively, and likely the source of much confusion among
10. Cryptocurrencies, AusTL. SEC.& INV. COMMISSION (last updated Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/investing/investment-warnings/virtual-currencies
(explaining that a blockchain is a virtual recording system which allows users to
continuously add new records of data (the "blocks") to its ledger (the "chain") while
permanently retaining all previously recorded transactions).
11. Michael J.W. Rennock et al., Blockchain Technology and Regulatory
Investigations, PRACTICAL LAW - LITIGATION, at 36 (Feb./Mar. 2018) (explaining that
other applications of DLT act similarly to many popular blockchain networks but do not
actually employ a blockchain); see also LABCFTC, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMIssioN, A CFTC Primer on Virtual Currencies 4, 8 (Oct. 17, 2017) (citing I.R.S.
Notice 2014-21, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/virtual
-currencies) (listing "Potential Use Cases of Blockchain/DLT Technology"),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/documents/file/labcftc_prime
rcurrenciesl00417.pdf; see also Brian Curran, What is the Tangle? Complete Guide to
IOTA 's Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), BLOCKONOMI (July 24, 2018), https://block
onomi.com/iota-tangle/ (explaining IOTA, a Directed Acyclic Graph ("DAG"), which
employs DLT but not blockchain technology).
12. Shaan Ray, The Difference Between Blockchains & Distributed Ledger
Technology, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Feb. 19, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/the-
difference-between-blockchains-distributed-ledger-technology-427 15a0fa92;
LABCFTC, supra note 11, at 6.
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courts, not all virtual currencies use DLT; many cannot be used in place of
fiat currency, and some even entirely lack monetary functionality.' 3 Instead,
a virtual currency is simply "a digital representation of value" that exists only
online, has no legal government-tender status, and can be traded as "(1) a
medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of
value."" "Cryptocurrencies" are a specific subset of virtual currencies that
utilize DLT and secure transactions with cryptography, making them
extremely difficult to counterfeit and therefore highly effective for use in
financial transactions." A "token" is a tool most often used as a transactional
unit on a virtual currency network.'6 Tokens may represent virtually any
asset or interest and exist in many different forms, dictated entirely by their
intended use." Lastly, the term "digital currency" is often used to describe
the digital (or online) representation of either a virtual or fiat currency.
B. Permissioned, Convertible, Both, or Neither?
Blockchain networks generally exist in two main forms: "permissioned"
networks, which outside users cannot access without the owner's permission,
and "permission-less" networks, which "anyone can access and use."i9
Further, certain virtual currencies are "convertible," meaning they can be
either exchanged directly for fiat currencies or used entirely in their place to
13. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48 (discussing networks that, while
lacking monetary value, can be traded as a "medium of exchange" of information); see
also Masonv. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457, 465 (D. Md. 2015) (involving an
non-DLT virtual currency which users purchase with fiat currency and can only employ
within a closed virtual casino and cannot transfer elsewhere).
14. See KEY DEFINITIONS, supra note 2, at 4; see also LABCFTC, supra note 11, at 4
(citing I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-
employed/virtual-currencies) (providing the same definition); In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC
No. 15-29, 2015 WL 5535736, at *2 n.2 (Sept. 17, 2015) (providing the definition of
Bitcoin as a virtual currency) [hereinafter Coinflip Order].
15. See Cryptocurrency, supra note 3.
16. Id.
17. Id.; Cryptographic Tokens, BLOCKCHAINHUB, https://blockchainhub.net/tokens/
(last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (describing different types of tokens and their use by
cryptocurrency networks).
18. See KEY DEFINITIONS, supra note 2, at 4. However, due to its relatively
inconsistent use and negligible import here, "digital currency" will not be used in this
Comment. See, e.g., Andrew Tar, Digital Currencies vs. Cryptocurrencies, Explained,
COINTELEGRAPH (Dec. 13, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/explained/digital-currencies
-vs-cryptocurrencies-explained (defining "digital currency" as synonymous with "virtual
currency").
19. See KEY DEFINITIONS, supra note 2, at 4; see also infra text accompanying notes
37-39 (discussing Ripple, a permissioned network); Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F.
Supp. 3d 457, 465 (D. Md. 2015) (involving a permissioned network that users could
only access with the owner's permission, granted to those purchasing in-game currency).
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trade for physical goods or services. 20 "Non-convertible" virtual currencies
cannot be exchanged for fiat currencies, physical goods, or services because
they are specifically designed for use within a closed (usually entirely
virtual) domain. 21
C. Key Distinctions Between Prominent Networks
1. Bitcoin
The Bitcoin Network is the first-ever established cryptocurrency and the
most popular virtual currency among speculative investors, consumers, and,
consequently, financial regulators. 22  This network is a permission-less
blockchain designed to facilitate anonymous peer-to-peer financial
transactions without reliance on a centralized authority to verify these
transactions. 23 The network's token, Bitcoin, is convertible and transferable
between individual virtual wallets that exist either online or locally on a
computing device.2 4 This enables users to buy, sell, and exchange Bitcoin
with each other directly for cash and through online exchanges using a credit
card or a bank account.2 5
Individuals can also "mine" Bitcoin by using computers (usually designed
to generate enormous amounts of computing power) to solve complex
algorithms that each generate one Bitcoin when solved. 26 Because Bitcoins
are finite in supply, they derive their value from: (1) supply and demand on
the open market, (2) overall cryptocurrency market conditions, and (3) the
network's user-base, which pools assets to create, sustain, and change the
20. See KEY DEFINITIONS, supra note 2, at 4; see also infra text accompanying note
24 (describing Bitcoin's convertibility).
21. See KEY DEFINITIONS, supra note 2, at 4; LABCFTC, supra note 11, at 4; see,
e.g., Mason, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 465 (involving a non-convertible currency only useable
in a virtual casino).
22. See Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization, COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (listing Bitcoin's market
capitalization at $60 billion, more than triple that of second-place XRP at $12 billion);
Bernard Marr, A Short History ofBitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/
12/06/a-short-history-of-bitcoin-and-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/ (reporting
that Bitcoin is the first-ever functioning cryptocurrency); see also LABCFTC, supra note
11, at 2 (focusing on Bitcoin).
23. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,




26. Id. at 3.
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token's value against fiat currencies. 27 Currently, Bitcoin is mainly
purchased specifically for returns on potential value appreciation by
speculative investors. 28 The price of Bitcoin - as well as that of most other
cryptocurrencies - varies significantly based on the particular country, and
even the particular exchange within a country, from which they are
purchased. 29 Bitcoin's development also prompted later cryptocurrencies
known as "alt-coins," which seek to improve on specific aspects of Bitcoin's
coding protocol (such as user privacy or transaction speed, for example)
while maintaining all of Bitcoin's fundamental attributes discussed in this
section.30 Tese, collectively with Bitcoin, are referred to as "Bitcoin-class
networks" for the purposes of this Comment.
2. Ethereum & Smart Contracts
"Smart-contract" networks are a narrower subset of cryptocurrencies
designed to accomplish a range of tasks vastly different from that of Bitcoin-
class networks, and therefore employ entirely distinct coding protocols.3 '
Specifically, smart-contract cryptocurrencies seek to replace traditional
paper contracts by offering two main advantages: (1) dramatically reduced
costs associated with traditional contractual transactions, and (2) extensive
security measures for securing these transactions. 32
27. David Prather, Expert Q&A: Bitcoin Compensation, Practical Law Article 0-
573-7085, PRACTICAL LAW- LABOR& EMPLOYMENT (July 8, 2014); JohnKelleher, Why
do Bitcoins Have Value?, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.
investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/why-do-bitcoins-have-value.asp; The Bitcoin
Phenomenon: How Cryptocurrencies Gain Value, CORNELL UNIVERSITY (Nov. 25,
2016), https://blogs.cornell.edu/info204O/2016/11/25/the-bitcoin-phenomenon-how-
cryptocurrencies-gain-value/ (discussing factors that determine cryptocurrency values).
28. Fiorillo, supra note 4, at 1; Martha C. White, How to Invest in Bitcoin: Here's
What You Need To Know, TIME (Dec. 14, 2017), http://time.com/money/5063203/how-
to-invest-in-bitcoin/.
29. See Bob Pisani & Todd Haselton, Here's Why Bitcoin Prices Are Different on
Each Exchange, CNBC (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/12/why-
bitcoin-prices-are-different-on-each-exchange.html (explaining how prices vary
depending upon liquidity, inefficiency, and uncommon pricing).
30. See Prableen Bajpai, The 10 Most Important Cryptocurrencies Other Than
Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/
tech/most-important-cryptocurrencies-other-than-bitcoin/ (explaining and comparing
coding protocols of popular alt-coins with that of Bitcoin).
31. See ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (explaining
that smart-contract cryptocurrencies run smart contracts on their networks).
32. See Ari Juels & William Marino, Understanding Smart Contract Mechanics,
Practical Law Practice Note w-005-3262, PRACTICAL LAW - FINANCE (Mar. 1, 2017)
(explaining that smart contracts are "a form of computer code run in a framework that
resembles execution by a trusted third party" and are "helping enforce the terms of
traditional legal agreements"); see also LabCFTC, A Primer on Smart Contracts, CFTC
(Nov. 27, 2018), at 4-10 [hereinafter Primer on Smart Contracts] (explaining smart
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The most popular smart-contract cryptocurrency among investors is
Ethereum, a permission-less blockchain that operates on a coding protocol
largely distinct from that of Bitcoin-class networks.3 3 Specifically, the
Ethereum network stores not only transactional data regarding a native
token, as Bitcoin-class networks do, but also code for "smart contracts,"
which users can employ for a wide-range of tasks.3 4 This enables Ethereum's
native token, Ether, to be used not just for financial transactions (like tokens
on Bitcoin-class networks), but also for facilitating virtual contract
transactions, which enforce party obligations without reliance on a
traditional central authority (such as a court or a mediator), while minimizing
the counterparty risk associated with doing so.35 Like Bitcoin, Ether and
similar smart-contract tokens operate on cryptocurrency networks, can be
mined and are convertible.3 6
3. Other Networks
Beyond the scope of convertible cryptocurrencies based on permission-
less and Smart-contract networks, developers continue to create a broad
array of new virtual currencies with entirely distinct coding protocols for
drastically different and highly innovative uses.37 Ripple, for example, is a
convertible cryptocurrency token based on a permissioned blockchain.38
contracts and how developers are applying blockchain technology to create decentralized
Smart-contract networks).
33. See Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization, supra note 22, at 3; see
also Julianne Harm et al., Ethereum vs. Bitcoin, THE ECONOMIST, 3-6
https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/creighton universitykraken case
study.pdf (last visited May 13, 2019) (explaining coding protocol distinctions between
Bitcoin and Ethereum); ETHEREUM, supra note 31, at 4 (listing Ethereum's intended uses,
including the registry of debts, transactions under provided instructions - in a will or
futures contact, for example, and the development of markets).
34. Juels & Marino, supra note 32, at 4.
35. Id.; see also Primer on Smart Contracts, supra note 32, at 11-16 (listing potential
benefits and uses of smart contracts, including derivatives, securities, supply chain
management, record keeping, trade clearing, and insurance automation).
36. See Juels & Marino, supra note 32, at 4 (providing that these tokens are referred
to as "Smart-contract networks"); see, e.g., Primer on Smart Contracts, supra note 32,
at 4 ("Fundamentally, a 'smart contract' is a set of coded computer functions."); see also
Ryan Smith, What is Tezos (XTZ)? A Beginner's Guide to the Controversial Coin,
COINCENTRAL (Aug. 20, 2018), https://coincentral.com/what-is-tezos-xtz-a-beginners-
guide-to-the-controversy-coin/ (explaining Tezos, a smart-contract cryptocurrency
similar to Ethereum which allows users to self-govern the network through voting).
37. Andrew Medal, 10 Incredible Uses for Cryptocurrency and Blockchain You
Probably Haven't Thought Of ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.entre
preneur.com/article/305859.
38. RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018). See Phil Fersht, The Top
5 Enterprise Blockchain Platforms You Need to Know, HORSES FOR SOURCES (Mar. 16,
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Accordingly, Ripple and similar networks offer the transactional efficiency
and security of Bitcoin, but lack Bitcoin's (almost complete) user-anonymity
due to their reliance on a centralized authority for verifications.39 Ripple's
coding protocol was specifically designed to facilitate fast, secure data and
financial transfer transactions between large financial institutions, many of
which are currently exploring the implementation of Ripple.40
Certain virtual currencies issue tokens that derive their value from real-
world assets, entirely irrespective of supply, demand, consumer popularity,
and other external factors regarding the tokens themselves.4 Tether, for
example, is a permission-less blockchain designed to enable businesses to
efficiently access fiat currencies by supporting three different tokens on its
network, each of which is fully backed by real-world fiat currency assets
held in Tether's reserve account. 42  Accordingly, users of asset-backed
networks cannot (theoretically, at least) manipulate the price of tokens. 43
Other virtual currency networks do not support tokens at all, and therefore
have no monetary value. For example, the Estonian government is
2018), https://www.horsesforsources.com/top-5-blockchain-platforms_031618 ("[The
company] aims to connect banks, payment providers, digital asset exchanges and
corporates through RippleNet, with nearly-free global transactions without any
chargebacks. It enables global payments through its digital asset called 'Ripples or XRP'
that has become one of the most popular cryptocurrency just behind Bitcoin and Ether.").
39. See Scott D. Hughes, Cryptocurrency Regulations and Enforcement in the U.S.,
45 W. St. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (2017). Ripple and similar networks are referred to as "Ripple-
class networks" for the purposes of this Comment.
40. See What Are the Advantages of Ripple?, FX TRADE ONLINE (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://fx-tradeonline.com/what-are-the-advantages-of-ripple; see also Victor
Tangermann, The U.S. Challenges Iran's Attempt to Develop a Cryptocurrency,
FUTURISM (Dec. 22, 2018), https://futurism.com/us-congress-iran-sanctions-crypto
currency (reporting on Iran's plans to launch a state-backed, permissioned
cryptocurrency network).
41. See From Network-Backed to Asset-Backed: Will Security Tokens Take Crypto
Mainstream?, LCX (Oct. 3, 2018), https://medium.com/lcx/from-network-backed-to-
asset-backed-will-security-tokens-take-crypto-mainstream-37f5547c2948. These tokens
are referred to as "Asset-backed networks" for the purposes of this Comment. See id.
42. FAQs, TETHER, https://tether.to/faqs/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (listing Tether's
tokens, USDT, EURT, and JPYT, which are backed by (and pegged to the price of) U.S.
Dollars (USD), Euros (EUR), and Japanese Yen (JPY), respectively).
43. See id. But see Neer Varshney, Report Suggests Tether Market Manipulation on
Kraken Cryptocurrency Exchange, THE NEXT WEB (June 29, 2018, 3:46 PM),
https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/06/29/tether-kraken-market-manipulation/
(discussing signs of market-manipulation on Tether's network and related investigations
by U.S. regulators).
44. Virtual currencies may also employ tokens which lack monetary value because
they are not convertible. See, e.g., Masonv. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457, 465




currently implementing a permissioned cryptocurrency network called
Keyless Signature Infrastructure ("KSI") to store and protect all public-
sector data. Because it records only the "hash values" of data records and
prevents its (previously approved) users from accessing the actual
information on these records, KSI does not employ tokens of any kind, and
its only possible use is for tracking changes - the newly added blocks -
made to its records - the chains. 6 Another similar network is R3, an open-
source blockchain network developed cooperatively by a group of the
world's largest financial institutions to efficiently manage complex internal
financial agreements.4 Like KSI, R3 is permissioned network that has no
native token, allowing only for informational transactions." KSI, R3, and
other similar networks are referred to "Information blockchains" for the
purposes of this Comment.
D. DLT-based Derivatives & Investment Vehicles
Financial institutions and private investment funds are now using virtual
currencies as the basis of financial tools and investment vehicles. In
December 2017, for example, the only virtual currency-based futures
available to the public - Bitcoin futures - were officially listed for sale.49
Developers are also increasingly providing the public with access to Initial
Coin Offerings ("ICOs"), which involve the crowd-funding of new networks
through pre-release sales of tokens to early investors at a (speculatively) low-
cost price.so Further, many financial institutions and private investors now
offer public access to cryptocurrency-based investment funds, or "crypto-
funds," which act exactly as traditional investment funds but instead rely on
45. See Steve Cheng et al., Using Blockchain to Improve Data Management in the
Public Sector, MCKINSEY (Feb. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
digital-mckinsey/our-insights/using-blockchain-to-improve-data-management-in-the-
public-sector.
46. See KSJ Technology Stack, GUARD TIME, https://guardtime.com/technology (last
visited Feb. 4, 2019); see also Hash Values, TRENDMICRO, https://www.trendmicro.com
/vinfo/us/security/definition/hash-values (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (explaining hash
values).
47. See The R3 Story, R3, https://www.r3.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).
48. Id.; see also Fersht, supra note 38 ("There is no built-in token or cryptocurrency
for [R3], and it is a permissioned blockchain as it restricts access to data within an
agreement to only those explicitly entitled to it, rather than the entire network.").
49. John McCrank, Cboe, CME to Launch Bitcoin Futures Contracts, REUTERS
(Dec. 7, 2017, 1:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-futures-contracts/
cboe-cme-to-launch-bitcoin-futures-contracts-idUSKBN1E10KC.
50. See Michael R. Meadows, The Evolution of Crowdfunding: Reconciling
Regulation Crowdfunding with Initial Coin Offerings, 30 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 272,
273 (2018) (explaining ICOs).
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the global cryptocurrency market as the source of their underlying
investment vehicles."' One notable crypto-fund that presented investors with
a relatively unique opportunity was the Decentralized Autonomous
Organization ("DAO"), an online venture capital fund designed to raise start-
up capital for emerging blockchain projects. 5 2 The DOA's network provided
each investor with DAO tokens in proportion to their existing Ether holdings,
representing the investors' interests in (1) voting on which projects the DAO
will fund on its network and (2) collecting returns on successful
* 53investments.
III. FEDERAL COURTS & REGULATORS
Lacking legislative guidance, numerous federal agencies - including the
Federal Reserve, Internal Revenue Service, Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network - and several state legislatures impose their own distinct (and
often conflicting) classifications and regulatory frameworks for virtual
currencies.54  Despite the resulting confusion among investors, regulators,
and federal courts, the current regulatory landscape has developed mainly
around efforts by securities and commodities regulators to expand their
jurisdictional purviews to encompass virtual currencies, crypto-funds, and
other related investment vehicles. 55
51. See Surbhi Jain, Rise ofthe Cryptocurrency Investment Fund: These Are 5 ofthe
Largest, FRONTERA (Dec. 3, 2017), https://frontera.net/cryptocurrency/rise-of-the-crypto
currency-investment-fund-these-are-5 -of-the-largest/.
52. Laila Metjahic, Note, Deconstructing the DAO: The Needfor Legal Recognition
and the Application ofSecurities Laws to Decentralized Organizations, 39 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1533, 1542-46, 1544. The DAO initially raised $150 million worth of Etherbefore
hackers found an exploit it its coding protocol and stole $60 million worth of funds,
ultimately collapsing the network. While the DAO is no longer operational, it will be
used for analysis because its extensive consumer popularity, unique nature, and resulting
attention from the SEC provides unparalleled insight into the agency's legal basis for
regulating such networks, ICOs, and virtual currencies overall. See generally, Michael
del Castillo, The Developers Behind the DAO Are Launching a New DAO, CoINDESK
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/dao-developers-launching-new-dao
(discussing the collapse of the DAO).
53. Id. at 1545-46. The DAO and similar networks are known as "DAOs." See,
e.g., What is a DAO?, BLOCKCHAIN HUB, https://blockchainhub.net/dao-decentralized-
autonomous-organization/ ("A DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Network) can be seen
as the most complex form of a smart contract .... ).
54. See Rooney, supra note 6; see also David Morgan, Congress Sets Sights on
Federal Cryptocurrency Rules, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-crypto-currencies-congress/congress-sets-sights-on-federal-cryptocurrency-
rules-idUSKCN1G31AG (discussing congressional efforts).
55. See Trevor Dodge, SEC and CFTC Chairmen Testify Before Senate on




A. Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC")
As the primary regulator of U.S. securities markets, the SEC derives its
regulatory authority in two main ways. 6 First, in passing the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 - the federal statute which grants the SEC regulatory
authority over trading markets, financial reporting obligations, insider
trading, and broker conduct - Congress explicitly classified certain
financial instruments as securities." Second, the SEC now employs the
Supreme Court's "Howey test" to classify newly emerging financial products
as "investment contracts" subject to its oversight, consequently
"determin[ing] the purview of its jurisdiction." Howey's central inquiry is
"whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."59 If so, "it
is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or non-speculative or
whether there is a sale of property with or without intrinsic value."6 o In
practice, Howey is broken down into four essential elements: (1) an
investment of money; (2) an investment in a common enterprise; (3) an
expectation of profits from the investment; and (4) profits that are generated
solely from the efforts of others.i
The SEC maintains that most tokens and all ICOs are securities because
they satisfy Howey.62 In July 2017, the agency released a report regarding
regulation/.
56. See generally What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM., https://www.sec.gov
/Article/whatwedo.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2018) (describing the SEC's mission,
duties, and jurisdiction).
57. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
(2018).
58. See also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946) (establishing and
applying the Howey Test to deem shares in a farming enterprise "investment contracts,"
which are synonymous with "securities" for regulatory purposes); SEC v. Edwards, 540
U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (reaffirming and applying W.J Howey); Stephen O'Neal, SEC,
CFTC, IRS and Others: A Guide to US Regulating Bodies, COINTELEGRAPH (May 26,
2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sec-cftc-irs-and-others-a-guide-to-us-regulating-
bodies.
59. WJ. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 (internal citations omitted).
60. Id. For the purposes of this Comment, "security" is used to describe a valid
"investment contract" under Howey and/or the Exchange Act because, unlike the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") jurisdiction regarding
commodities, all securities fall within SEC jurisdiction. See generally infra Section III.B
(discussing CFTC jurisdiction).
61. See Securities Litigation: Jurisdictional Defenses, Practical Law Practice Note
w-000-6535, PRACTICALLAW-LITIGATION (2019) (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1946)).
62. See Why the SEC Thinks Most Tokens Are Securities and When the SEC Thinks
a Token Might Stop Being a Security, WILSON SONSiNI GOODRICH & ROSATTI (Aug. 1,
2018) [hereinafter SEC Thinks Most Tokens Are Securities"]; Dodge, supra note 55
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its investigation of the DAO where it reported its findings that DAO tokens
are securities.63 In January 2018, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton Giancarlo
warned in a multi-agency op-ed concerning DLT products that his agency
"will vigorously pursue [ICOs that] seek to evade the registration, disclosure
and anti-fraud requirements of our securities laws," which he believes are
wide-spread.6" Shortly after, the SEC's Director of Corporate Finance
released a statement detailing four central factors that the SEC considers in
evaluating a specific token under Howey: whether its issuers (1) play a
significant role in developing and maintaining the token and its potential to
increase in value; (2) retain an interest so that they have financial incentive
to increase its value; (3) raise funds in excess of those needed to launch the
platform; and (4) market the tokens to the public as opposed to specific users
of the platform."
B. Commodities Futures Trading Commission
As the regulatory agency tasked with oversight of U.S. commodity futures
trading, the CFTC derives its jurisdiction from the Commodity Exchange
Act (the "CEA"),6 6 which Congress enacted in 1936 to regulate "the trading
of commodity futures" and establish the "statutory framework under which
the CFTC operates."6 7 Section 1(a)(9) of the CEA defines a "commodity"
as - in addition to an extensive list of physical products such as wheat,
cotton, and rice - "all other goods and articles, except onions ... and all
services, rights, and interests ... in which contracts for future delivery are
(noting SEC Chairman testimony to Congress that he "has not seen an ICO issue a token
that is not a security") (internal quotations omitted).
63. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 117 SEC Docket 5 (July 25,2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter The DAO Report]
(outlining the SEC's legal basis for regulating DAOs and ICOs). Though the report
concerns only DAOs and ICOs, its rationale can be imported to virtual currencies where
they present attributes focused on by the report. See id.; supra Section VI (applying The
DAO Report's rationale).
64. Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are Looking at
Cryptocurrency, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
regulators-are-looking-at-cryptocurrency- 1516836363; see, e.g., Rensel v. Centra Tech,
Inc., No. 17-24500-CIV-KING/SIMONTON, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106642, at *5
(S.D. Fla. June 25, 2018) (alleging violations of Security Act §§ 12(a) and 15(a) by ICO
issuers); Floyd Mayweather and DJ Khaled Pay SEC Cryptocurrency Penalties, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46394879.
65. See SEC Thinks Most Tokens Are Securities, supra note 62.
66. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §1 (2018).
67. Commodity Exchange Act & Regulations, U.S. COMMODITY FuTURES TRADING
COMMISSION, https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/CommodityExchangeAct/index
.htm. (last visited May 14, 2019) (discussing CFTC jurisdiction).
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presently or in the future dealt in."" In expanding its jurisdiction to
emerging products beyond those enumerated in § 1(a)(9) and those that fall
outside its statutory authority over price-manipulation of commodities in
interstate commerce,69 the CFTC currently interprets § 1(a)(9) definition as
broadly encompassing both assets currently underlying a regulated futures
market - usually referred to as a Designated Futures Market ("DCM")70
- and those capable of doing so in the future.i The agency definitively
has "exclusive jurisdiction regarding accounts, agreements[,] . . . and
transactions involving swaps[,]"; the term "swap" is defined in part as: "any
agreement, contract, or transaction- (i) that is a ... option of any kind ...
[or] (ii) that provides for any purchase, sale, payment, or delivery ...
dependent on . . . a contingency .".. ."72
The CFTC may also regulate certain "retail commodity transactions,"
which include, inter alia, "transaction[s] in any commodity that is - entered
into with ... a person that is not an eligible contract participant or eligible
commercial entity; and entered into . . . on a leveraged or margined
basis . . . ", and exclude certain exceptions under § 2(h)(4). 73  "Eligible
contract participants" are, inter alia, individuals with discretionary
investments of more than $10 million or more than $5 million if the
68. 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(9) (known as the "Dealt-in Requirement"); see, e.g., Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'nv. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 497 (D. Mass.
2018) ("Congress' approach to defining 'commodity' signals an intent that courts focus
on categories-not specific items when determining whether the 'dealt in' requirement
is met.").
69. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2).
70. For the purposes of this Comment, assets used as the basis of aDCM are referred
to as "DCM-underliers." See Trading Organizations, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURE
TRADING COMMISSION, https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/
DCMs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (defining "DCM" and discussing relevant
CFTC compliance standards).
71. See Statement of the Commission, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION, 2 (June 14, 2010), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/
public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/mdexcommissionstatement061410.pdf- LABCFTC,
supra note 14, at 11. But see David E. Aron & Matthew Jones, The CFTC's
Characterization of Virtual Currencies as Commodities: Implications under the
Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Regulations, 38 No. 5 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L.
REP. NL 1, § I-B (May 2018) (noting statements by two commissioners that the CFTC
"should interpret the statutory definition of commodity to have some limit or ... [it]
would be superfluous.").
72. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1(a)(47)(A), 2(a)(1)(A); see also SEC, The Regulatory Regime for
Security-Based Swaps 3 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/swaps-chart/swaps-chart.pdf
(defining derivative swaps as a derivative "in which two counterparties agree to
exchange or 'swap' payments with each other as a result of such things as changes in a
stock price, interest rate or commodity price").
73. 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(D)(i).
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transactions were intended to manage risk associated with ownership of an
asset," while "eligible commercial entities" are eligible contract participants
who meet additional requirements." However, § 2(h)(3) provides that
"nothing in this Act shall apply to . . . transaction[s] in an exempt
commodity ... entered into on a principal-to-principal basis solely between
persons that are eligible commercial entities . . . and executed or traded on
an electronic trading facility."7 6
In 2015, the CFTC deemed virtual currencies commodities subject to its
jurisdiction under the CEA. Despite failing to provide clear guidance, the
agency established its view that: (1) virtual currencies are commodities; (2)
sales of options on virtual currencies fall within its purview; and (3) virtual
currencies are not "real" currencies. 7' However, the agency failed to provide
much analytical support for its primary finding - that virtual currencies are
commodities - arguing only that the CEA's definition is broad and citing
to a single case. 79 In late 2017, the CFTC released a primer detailing the
agency's guidance on DLT networks and virtual currencies.so The primer
states that S1(a)(9) properly encompasses "Bitcoin and other virtual
currencies," meaning the CFTC has jurisdiction over cryptocurrencies when
they (1) are used in a derivatives contract; or (2) involve fraud or
manipulation, so long as they are traded in interstate commerce." Notably,
the primer warns consumers that online exchanges may not be "subject to
the supervision which applies to regulated exchanges," including those that
engage in only certain spot or cash market transactions and do not utilize
margin, leverage, or financing."8 2 Referencing The DAO Report, the primer
also notes that "[t]here is no inconsistency between the SEC's analysis and
the CFTC's determination."83 In November 2018, the CFTC released a
second primer regarding DLT networks, this time listing potential legal
frameworks which may apply to Smart-contract networks and noting when
they may fall within its jurisdiction.
74. Id. § 1(a)(18)(A)(xi).
75. Id. § 1(a)(17).
76. Id. § 2(h)(3).
77. See Coinflip Order, supra note 14, at 3.
78. Id. at 2-3, n.2; see also infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (discussing
the CFTC's implied classification of virtual currencies as "exempt commodities").
79. See Coinflip Order, supra note 14, at 3 (citing Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 677 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir.) (1982)).
80. See LABCFTC, supra note 11.
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 14.
84. See Primer on Smart Contracts, supra note 32, at 22, 25.
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C CFTC v. McDonnell
In March 2018, the CFTC alleged that a virtual currency trader developed
a deceptive scheme to defraud investors by misappropriating their funds
under the guise of a legitimate advisor for the trading and purchasing of
cryptocurrencies.Y The resulting case, McDonnell, yielded the first (and so
far, only) final judgement, in which a federal court formally recognized the
CFTC's broad classification of virtual currencies as commodities that are
subject to the agency's jurisdiction. Most importantly, the court held that:
(1) virtual currencies are commodities subject to CFTC regulation under
§ 1(a)(9); and (2) the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to the CEA permit the
CFTC to regulate fraud beyond the sale of futures or derivative contracts,
including "fraud related to virtual currencies sold in interstate commerce"
under § 6(c)(1)."
McDonnell relies exclusively on two forms of factual authority in its
reasoning on this issue. First, the court cites Black's Law Dictionary's and
Merriam Webster's definitions of "commodity."" Second, it cites two legal
commentators, noting their arguments that virtual currencies should be
regulated as a commodity "based on [the term's] common usage, . . .because
virtual currencies provide a 'store of value'[, and] . . .because they serve as
a type of monetary exchange."8 9 The only further support is the court's
85. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'nv. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 216,
230 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal citation omitted).
86. See Michael W. Brooks, CFTC v. McDonnell: AmidstAll the Hype, Don't Forget
Commodity is a Defined Term, NAT'L L. REv. (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/cftc-v-mcdonnell-amidst-all-hype-don-t-forget-commodity-defined-
term.
87. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 213. Though other jurisdictions have challenged
McDonnell's application of § 6(c)(1) to the facts in that case because they did not involve
allegations of market manipulation, this issue requires extensive analysis and is beyond
the scope of this comment. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Monex
Credit Co., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (internal citation omitted)
("[T]he CEA unambiguously forecloses the application of § 6(c)(1) in the absence of
actual or potential market manipulation."). But see id. at 1189 n.12 (noting that the pro
se defendant in McDonnell neglected to raise this issue, which may explain why the court
did not consider it more closely); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'nv. My Big Coin
Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 498 (D. Mass. 2018) (citing McDonnell in rejecting that
the CFTC's § 6(c)(1) anti-fraud authority requires allegations of market manipulation).
88. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 224 (alteration in original) (internal citations
omitted) ("Black's Law Dictionary defines a commodity as 'an article of trade or
commerce.' Merriam Webster defines it as '[a]n economic good . .. [or] an article of
commerce....').
89. Id. at 224-25; see also id. (quoting Mitchell Prentis, Digital Metal: Regulating
Bitcoin As A Commodity, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 609, 626, 628-29 (2015) ("'It would
make sense for regulators to treat Bitcoin as a commodity. Commodities are generally
defined as "goods sold in the market with a quality and value uniform throughout the
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mention of legislative and judicial expansion of the CEA from its original
purpose of overseeing agricultural commodities trading to regulating other
goods, services, and interests, including intangible assets. 90  Next,
McDonnell discusses the CFTC's own interpretation and expansion of its
§ la(9) jurisdiction before briefly concluding:
Virtual currencies are 'goods' exchanged in a market for a uniform quality
and value. They fall well-within the common definition of 'commodity'
as well as the CEA's definition of 'commodities' as 'all other goods and
articles ... in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the
future dealt in.91
The court then moves directly to the issue of concurrent jurisdiction, which
is beyond the scope of this Comment and not discussed here.
D. Other Case Law
Aside from McDonnell, federal regulators have thus far secured favorable
92
rulings only on pre-trial motions. Federal courts have, however, issued
ultimate decisions in several cases involving CFTC and SEC jurisdiction
over other goods and services. These decisions are highly useful for
analyzing virtual currency classification because they involve the very same
issues regulators must confront in classifying virtual currencies. 93
world." This ... realistically reflects the economic behavior of Bitcoin users' ....
'Bitcoin should primarily be considered a commodity because it serves the function of
money. . . .'); id. at 224 (quoting Jeff Currie, Bullion Bests Bitcoin, Not Bitcoin,
GOLDMAN SACHS Top MIND, Mar. 11, 2014, at 7, https://www.paymentlawadvisor.com
/files/2014/01/GoldmanSachs-Bit-Coin.pdf) ("'A commodity is any item that
"accommodates" . . . the need for a store of value .... In contrast, a security is any
instrument that is "secured" against something else .... [B]itcoin ... is a commodity
and not a currency . . ..').
90. Id. at 225 (citing United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 694 (5th Cir. 2012)); In
re Barclays Bank PLC, CFTC Docket No. 15-24, 2015 WL 2445059 (May 20, 2015)).
91. Id. at 226-28 (citing Mitchell Prentis, Digital Metal: Regulating Bitcoin As A
Commodity, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 609 (2015); citing 7 U.S.C. § la(9) (2012)).
92. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334
F. Supp. 3d 492, 494 (D. Mass. 2018) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss because
the CFTC alleged sufficient facts for a fact-finder to deem the cryptocurrency at issue a
commodity under CEA § la(9)) (hereinafter "My Big Coin"); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Gillespie, No. 18-cv-10077, ECF No. 106, at 4-9 (D. Mass. Sept.
26, 2018) (same); United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-CR-647, 2018 WL 4346339, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss because the SEC
alleged sufficient facts for a fact-finder to classify the ICOs at issue as securities under
Howey).
93. See infra Sections IV.A.2, IV.B, VI (discussing issues with the commodities




Though the SEC and others have applied the Howey decision to legally
recognize abroad variety of assets as securities, as discussed, the SEC's legal
victories regarding virtual currency jurisdiction are currently limited to pre-
trial rulings. 9" However, the agency has taken significant steps outside of
court to expand its reach to virtual currencies, particularly regarding ICOs.95
In The DAO Report, the agency briefly notes Bitcoin satisfying Howey's
first factor - the investment of money - by citing Tenth Circuit and Texas
District Court decisions.96 The DAO Report entirely disregards Howey's
second factor: the need for "a common enterprise."9 7 This is particularly
notable because circuits remain split on whether the SEC must show
"horizontal commonality"98 or "vertical commonality"99 to satisfy this
factor.' Some jurisdictions further delineate this factor by requiring that a
94. See, e.g., Securities Litigation: Jurisdictional Defenses, supra note 61 (citing
SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 772 (11th Cir. 2007) (interests in corporate
partnerships); Wuligerv. Eberle, 414 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820-24 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (viatical
settlement interests in life-insurance policies); Gilmore v. MONY Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
165 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1284-88 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (variable annuities); SEC v. SG Ltd.,
265 F.3d 42, 54-55 (1st Cir. 2001) (Ponzi schemes); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473, 478-85 (5th Cir. 1974) (pyramid and multi-level marketing schemes).
95. See, e.g., The DAO Report, supra note 64.
96. Id. at 11 (citing Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d
564 (10th Cir. 1991)); Id. (citing SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182,
at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013)).
97. Id.; see also Securities Litigation: Jurisdictional Defenses, supra note 61
(discussing the Howey factors).
98. "Horizontal commonality" considers whether investors' fortunes are tied
together by their pooling of assets. See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d
Cir. 1994) (requiring horizontal commonality and defining it as "the tying of each
individual investor's fortunes to the fortunes of the other investors by the pooling of
assets").
99. "Vertical commonality" instead focuses on whether the investors' gains or losses
are inseparable from the effectiveness of the investment's promoter. SEC v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974) (focusing on whether the "fortunes
of all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy" of the investment's promoter).
100. Compare Revak, 18 F.3d at 87 (noting the Second Circuit's horizontal
commonality requirement and holding that "broad" vertical commonality is insufficient),
and Hart v. Pulte Homes of Michigan Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1984)
(describing the Sixth Circuit as "requiring ... horizontal commonality"), with Long v.
Shultz Cattle Co., Inc. 881 F.2d 129, 140 (5th Cir. 1989) ("This court, together with the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, has explicitly rejected the view that horizontal commonality
is a prerequisite ... within the meaning of Howey and has focused instead on the 'vertical
commonality' .... ), and SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th
Cir. 1974) (establishing the Fifth Circuit's vertical commonality requirement), and SEC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting that the
Ninth Circuit requires vertical commonality); see also Ori Oren, ICO 's, DAO 's, and the
SEC: A Partnership Solution, 2018 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 617, 639 (noting outstanding
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more specific type of vertical commonality, either "broad" or "strict," be
shown."o0
Similarly, the SEC also dismissed the third Howey factor - the
expectation of profit - with relative ease, simply noting that investors
expected an increase in the value of their investments. 0 2  The report's
analysis focused almost entirely on arguing that The DAO Report satisfied
Howey's fourth factor - the sole efforts of others - because its founder's
efforts were essential to the enterprise, and investor's voting rights were
generally limited.' 03 It also underscores that, despite Howey's original
language, courts no longer require that investors expect profits from the "sole
efforts of others," literally, to satisfy the fourth Howey factor.' However,
while this assertion is technically accurate, circuit courts remain divided on
precisely how much effort by others is necessary and how much investor
effort is allowable.o' Lastly, The DAO Report includes a brief discussion
regarding the "foundational principles of the securities laws" and their direct
applicability to "capital raising entities making use of [DLT]."os
2. Commodities
As discussed, the Coinflip Order relied largely on Board of Trade v. SEC,
677 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir.),o 7 where the court found that the CEA's
legal questions and concerns regarding the second Howey factor's applicability to virtual
currencies).
101. See Revak, 18 F.3d at 87-88 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Long v. Shultz Cattle Co.,
Inc., 881 F.2d 129, 140-41 (5th Cir.1989); Brodtv. Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459, 461
(9th Cir. 1978)) ("To establish 'broad vertical commonality,' the fortunes of the investors
need be linked only to the efforts of the promoter. 'Strict vertical commonality' requires
that the fortunes of investors be tied to the fortunes of the promoter.") (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted); see generally Ryan Bomeman, Why the Common Enterprise
Test Lacks a Common Definition, 5 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L. J. 16 (2005) (discussing
jurisdictional splits on the vertical commonality requirement).
102. See The DAO Report, supra note 63, at 11-12.
103. Id. at 12-15.
104. Id. at 12 (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.
1973); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (citing SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946)) ("[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the
word 'security' in the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis
should be on economic reality.").
105. Compare Glenn W Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d at 482 (allowing investors to
contribute to sales activities and govemance decisions), with SEC v. Life Partners, Inc.,
102 F.3d 587, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (interpreting the word "solely" to mean
"predominantly").
106. See The DAO Report, supra note 63, at 11 ("This definition [of investment
contract] embodies a flexible rather than static principle.").




definition of commodity includes "literally anything[,] other than onions[,J"
underlying a DCM. 0 Given the lack of case law directly on point, courts
and legal analysts have centrally relied upon a relatively recent line of cases
involving the commodities classification as applied to natural gas.109 For
example, in United States v. Valencia,110 a defendant charged with
commodity-related fraud claimed that, while natural gas traded on the New
York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX") is clearly a commodity under the
CEA, no futures contracts existed on her firm's natural gas (West Coast gas),
specifically, and therefore it fell outside CFTC jurisdiction." However, the
District Court rejected these arguments because "natural gas is fungible" and
has traded on the NYMEX since 1990.112
Five years later, a defendant argued on appeal in United States v. Futch,11
that the natural gas at issue was not a commodity under the CEA because a
clause in the futures contracts traded on NYMEX described them as being
"for gas 'delivered at the Henry Hub, Louisiana' and the gas in this case was
delivered at [another location].""' As in Valencia, the Fifth Circuit rejected
these arguments once more, going as far as labelling them "frivolous.""
108. See Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing 7 U.S.C §
2 (1982)).
109. See, e.g., Aron & Jones, supra note 71, at 4-5 (citing Bd. of Trade, 677 F.2d
1137, 1145 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Valencia, No. Civ.A. H-03-024, 2003 WL
23174749, at * 1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003), vacated in part on reconsideration, No. H-
03-024, 2003 WL 23675402 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2003), rev'd and remanded, 394 F.3d
352 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 694-95 (5th Cir. 2012);
Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 227
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting commodity classification cases involving natural gas and their
applicability to virtual currency regulation); Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v.
My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 495-96 (D. Mass. Sept. 26 2018) (relying
on commodity cases involving natural gas in considering 7 U.S.C. § la(9)'s applicability
to networks other than Bitcoin).
110. United States v. Valencia, 394 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2004).
111. Valencia, 2003 WL 23174749, at *4 (noting the defendants' argument that,
otherwise, "nothing is excluded from CFTC oversight and CEA regulation" because the
CEA would be "applicable to any goods capable of being traded on a futures market,
even if not currently traded .... ); NYMEX, CME GROUP, https://www.cmegroup.com/
company/nymex.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (describing NYMEX as a DCM which
offers energy products, metals, and agricultural contracts).
112. Valencia, 2003 WL 23174749 at *8 n.13 (concluding that "[w]hile futures
traders apparently do not buy and sell West Coast natural gas on the NYMEX, there is
no evidence that West Coast gas could not in the future be traded on a futures
exchange.").
113. United States v. Futch, 278 F. App'x 387 (5th Cir. 2008).
114. Id. at 395.
115. See id. ("Henry Hub is the nexus of several major gas pipelines [and the clause
defendant cited] merely specifies the location for gas delivery and does not in any way
limit the type of commodity in question, natural gas.").
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Four years later, that court again cited Futch in rejecting the same argument
and essentially solidifying the CFTC's regulatory jurisdiction over natural
gas transactions in United States v. Brooks."' Supporting its holding with
three reasons, the court first underscored that "natural gas may be moved ...
to Henry Hub[,] .... [t]hus it would be peculiar that natural gas ... is not a
commodity, but suddenly becomes [one when] it passes through Henry Hub,
and ceases to be [one] once it moves [elsewhere].""' The court then noted
that the CEA's inclusion of an exemption for certain commodities, known as
exempt commodities," supports its holding because, otherwise, such an
exemption would be unnecessary."' Finally, the decision concludes by
noting that prior case law did not support that gas at hubs other than Henry
Hub is outside the CEA's purview despite failing to confront the issue,
specifically.1 9 Notably, courts have also limited the CFTC's jurisdiction
over commodities in interstate commerce under CEA l 1 a(19), holding that
the provision does not apply to cash forwards, cash transactions, and spot
transactions. 20
IV. ARE VIRTUAL CURRENCIES COMMODITIES?
To demonstrate that the CFTC's classification of all virtual currencies as
commodities lacks a substantial legal basis, this section analyzes the
commodities classification and its impact on CFTC jurisdiction over virtual
currency transactions.
A. Bitcoin is a Commodity
Given that the Bitcoin Network's attributes clearly satisfy the statutory
116. See United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 693-94 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing United
States v. Futch, 278 F. App'x 387, 392 (5th Cir. 2008)).
117. Id. at 694-95.
118. Id. at 695. Notably, in rejecting a different (but related) claim in regarding
exempt commodities, which will not be discussed here, Brooks cited reasoning from
Futch, which was later overturned. Id.
119. Id. (citing United States v. Futch, 278 F. App'x 387, 390 (5th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Valencia, 394 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Radley, 659 F.
Supp. 2d 803, 806 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'nv. Reed, 481
F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1195 (D. Colo. 2007); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Atha,
420 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Bradley, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (N.D. Okla. 2005); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d 259, 264 (S.D. Tex. 2005)). For the purposes of
this comment, these cases are collectively referred to as the "Natural Gas Cases."
120. See, United States v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1062
("The definition of 'future delivery' expressly excludes 'any sale of any cash commodity
for deferred shipment or delivery.' This is known as the 'cash forward' exclusion ....
[C]ourts ... have never doubted that § 4 does not apply to transactions in cash or spot
markets.") (internal citations omitted).
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definition of commodity as broadly interpreted by courts and regulators,
Bitcoins are likely commodities subject to CFTC regulation.
1. Commodities Exchange Act § la(9)
Under the CFTC's own interpretation of CEA § la(9), Bitcoin is a
commodity and falls within the agency's jurisdiction.121 Because § la(9)
does not specifically enumerate the term "virtual currency" or any of its
subsets, to be classified as commodities, blockchain networks must fall
within the CEA's jurisdiction over "all other goods and articles, except
onions . . . and all services, rights, and interests . . . in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in." 22 As discussed, the
CFTC interprets its statutory jurisdiction to mean that any asset underlying
a DCM is consequently a commodity.1 23 Assuming that, when held by
private investors, Bitcoin falls within one of these prescribed product
categories, it is well-within this reading of § la(9) commodity definition
simply because it underlies a DCM.1 24
2. Case Law
The CFTC's interpretation of § 1(a)(9) commodity definition regarding
DCM-underliers is also well-supported by case law. In Board of Trade of
Chicago, which remains good law, the Seventh Circuit held that "literally
anything other than onions could become a 'commodity' . . . simply by its
futures being traded on some exchange." 25 Though that decision was
ultimately vacated by the Supreme Court for mootness, the Natural Gas
Cases confronted the very same issue regarding natural gas and held that it
is a commodity simply based on its DCM-underlier status, as discussed
above.1 26 Accordingly, CFTC actions and relevant case law strongly support
that § 1(a)(9) grants the CFTC regulatory jurisdiction over Bitcoin simply
because it is currently a DCM-underlier.
121. 7 U.S.C. § la(9) (2018).
122. Id.; see also Aron & Jones, supra note 71, at Section II.A (underscoring that
cryptocurrencies must fall within the second prong of 7 U.S.C. § la(9) to be
commodities).
123. See Statement of the Commission, supra note 71.
124. See McCrank, supra note 49; see also Aron & Jones, supra note 71, at Section
IV.A ("Because the CFTC's futures jurisdiction keys off of the sale of a 'commodity'
(for future delivery) and the word 'commodity' is defined in 7 U.S.C. § la(9) in terms of
futures on the thing in question being dealt in, the [CFTC] has jurisdiction over
cryptocurrency futures from the moment they were dealt in.").
125. 677 F.2d at 1142.
126. See Bd. of Trade of Chic. v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982); see also Natural Gas
Cases, supra note 119.
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B. But CFTC Jurisdiction Stops There - The Dealt-in Requirement 2 7
When distinctions in the technical attributes of virtual currencies and the
numerous unsettled questions fundamental to establishing CFTC jurisdiction
over virtual currencies are accurately considered, the agency's regulatory
authority under § 1(a)(9) currently encompasses only Bitcoin and,
regardless, can never include networks that cannot serve as DCM-underliers
sometime in the future. The Natural Gas Cases perfectly demonstrate the
fundamental concern here: what exactly does the Dealt-in Requirement -
"presently or in the future dealt in" - mean?1 28 Definitive precedent on this
issue is essential to accurately classifying virtual currencies as commodities
because, currently, Bitcoin is the only network that underlies a DCM.1 2 9
Accordingly, when practically applied to virtual currencies, this question
actually requires two separate, equally important inquiries: (1) whether
§ la(9) commodity definition requires that the product already underlies a
DCM, or that it is simply capable of doing so in the future;'3 0 and (2) whether
§ 1(a)(9) commodity definition is general and categorical rather than
product-specific.' 3 ' Most importantly, the former inquiry - as well as an
affirmative answer to the latter - raises a third inquiry, which is of central
concern to this Comment: whether "virtual currency" may serve as a product
category of commodities under § la(9).132
127. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (citing the Dealt-in Requirement).
128. See David L. Beam et al., Court Finds That Virtual Currency Is a Commodity
For the Time Being, Legal Update, MAYER BROwN LLP (Nov. 5 2018),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/court-finds-that-virtual-currency-is-a-commodityfor-
the-time-being-11-05-2018/ (reporting on My Big Coin's consideration and broad
application of the CEA's commodity definition); Natural Gas Cases, supra note 119
(noting ambiguities of the CEA's commodity definition and interpreting it broadly). See
generally, 7 U.S.C. § la.
129. See McCrank, supra note 49.
130. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.
Supp. 3d 492 (D. Mass. Sept. 26 2018) (considering whether current DCM-underlier
status is required by 7 U.S.C. § la(9)); United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678 (5th Cir.
2012) (underscoring that "whether the CEA requires a commodity to be the subject of a
currently existing futures market" remains an open question).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Futch, 278 F. App'x 387 (5th Cir. 2008) (considering
whether 7 U.S.C. § la(9) applies only to specific products or to general product classes,
and whether a natural gas product class sufficient for broad commodity status existed
there); see also My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 496-98 (agreeing with the
CFTC's position that the CEA's commodity definition is general and categorical by
citing its explicit reference to "livestock," which does not enumerate any particular
species of animal). But see Beam et al., supra note 127 (concluding that "it remains to
be seen how persuasive other court's find [My Big Coin]'s holding" given the lesser
standard imposed on pre-trial motions).
132. See My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d at 492 (reading 7 U.S.C. § la(9)
broadly before considering whether the network at issue was of the same product class
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1. "Can Be" or "Are Being?"
While regulators continue their long-standing efforts to resolve these
questions definitively, courts remain divided. For example, despite Board
of Trade's sweeping language that anything (other than onions) can be a
commodity simply by underlying a DCM, the court exclusively focused on
the SEC's concession that - under the CEA's definition - the product at
issue "became a commodity when the Board of Trade began trading [its]
futures."'3 3 However, the court failed to explicitly clarify whether an
underlying asset could be a commodity without underlying an active
DCM.'3 4 Notably, a literal reading of the court's language - that
commodity status is enabled "simply by its futures being traded" - as well
as its ultimate finding regarding the product at issue, as noted above, could
only support the conclusion that Board of Trade requires that an active DCM
already exists.'3 5
Contrarily, the Southern District of Texas held in Valencia that the CEA's
commodities definition "includes goods that can be the subject of futures
contracts."' 36 There, however, the court failed to provide a test (or even mere
guidance) for making this determination regarding non-traditional and/or
emerging products, thereby leaving open a substantial gap in Valencia's
practical applicability to virtual currencies.' 3 7 Primarily, the decision sheds
no light on whether an existing DCM for one network is sufficient to regulate
others as commodities and, if so, how to deal with networks that can never
underly a DCM.' 38 Moreover, given that virtually anything with monetary
value "can be the subject of futures contracts,"' 39 Valencia essentially
as Bitcoin).
133. Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added).
134. See Aron& Jones, supra note 71, at 4. Board of Trade, therefore, should be read
narrowly as establishing that existing DCM-underlier status enables commodity
classification under the CEA. 677 F.2d at 1142-43.
135. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'nv. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).
136. See Aron & Jones, supra note 71, at 4 (citing United States v. Valencia, 394 F.3d
352 (5th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original).
137. See id.
138. DCM-underlier status requires monetary value, excluding certain networks.
Underlying Asset, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underlying-
asset.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2018) ("Underlying assets give derivatives their
value . . . [and are] used to determine the value of the option up till expiration. The value
of the underlying asset may change . . . affecting the value of the option . ... The price
of an option or futures contract is derived from the price of an underlying asset .... );
see also KSJ Technology Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI, which has no monetary
value and therefore could never be a DCM-underlier).
139. United States v. Valencia, No. Civ. A. H-03-024, 2003 WL 23174749, at *17
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003); see also Underlying Asset, supra note 138 (explaining that
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extends CFTC jurisdiction to all products with monetary value. But had
Congress intended to grant the CFTC such broad authority, why did it not
simply say so and avoid the much more nuanced (and clearly controversial)
language: "presently or in the future dealt in?"'
Futch provides even less clarity here because the decision focused entirely
on the fact that a DCM on natural gas already existed (and on the defendant's
prior admission of this in pre-trial pleadings) to deem it a commodity.
Similar to Board of Trade, a prima facie reading of the Futch decision could
only support that the DCM market must already exist to enable the
underlying asset's commodity status. 42 Brooks was the most clear, stating
explicitly (in dicta) that "whether the CEA requires a commodity to be the
subject of a currently existing futures market" remains an open question.1 43
Therefore, while Bitcoin's commodity classification, specifically, remains
well-founded under Board of Trade, Valencia, Futch, and Brooks, the CFTC
has no present legal basis for extending this classification to other virtual
i 44
currencies.
2. General or Specific?
Notably, however, the Natural Gas Cases appear to definitively establish
that § 1(a)(9) commodity definition is general and categorical rather than
product-specific. For example, as discussed, Valencia held that the natural
gas at issue was a commodity within CFTC jurisdiction because "natural gas
is fungible," clearly indicating the court's view that a particular good's
DCM-underlier status on any U.S. futures market is sufficient to deem it a
commodity under § 1(a)(9).14 The court in Futch deemed the defendant's
natural gas a commodity subject to CFTC oversight under the exact same
reasoning, going as far as labelling the defendant's arguments "frivolous.""4
And as Brooks concluded in deeming the gas there a commodity, finding
derivatives rely on an underlying asset's value).
140. See also infra notes 20448 and accompanying text (noting dramatic practical
consequences of McDonnell, all of which also apply to Valencia).
141. United States v. Futch, 278 F. App'x 387, 395 (5th Cir. 2008).
142. Id.
143. United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, n.11 (5th Cir. 2012).
144. See Natural Gas Cases, supra note 119. But see Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'nv. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492, 494 (D. Mass. 2018) (denying
defendant's motionto dismiss and agreeing with the CFTC's position that Bitcoin futures
enable broad virtual currency regulation because "Congress's approach to defining
'commodity' signals an intent that courts focus on categories - not specific items.").
145. See United States v. Valencia, No. Civ.A. H-03-024, 2003 WL 23174749, at *8
n.13 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003).
146. Futch, 278 F. App'x at 395.
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otherwise would have the absurd effect of changing the commodity status of
natural gas as it travelled through a pipeline hub specified in a futures
contract. 4 7
3. Is "Virtual Currency" a Product Category?
While Bitcoin is a commodity under subject to CFTC oversight CEA
§ la(9), this jurisdiction does not axiomatically extend from Bitcoin to any
(let alone all) other virtual currencies because it fails to meet both essential
requirements for doing so, as enumerated by federal courts.
Fundamentally, while one virtual currency presently underlies a DCM
(thereby satisfying the first requirement), the second requirement -
"fungibility" 49 - simply cannot, as a factual matter, apply to virtual
currencies more broadly.' The most relevant case law on point involved
natural gas - a product that (like all other presently recognized
commodities) is generally consistent in composition, potential uses,
transferability, availability, and investment-earning potential. "' As those
cases specifically emphasized as controlling in their reasoning, the "actual
nature" of natural gas does not change based on who extracts, uses, or sells,
and where they are doing so.15 2 In direct contrast, many virtual currencies
are entirely distinct from one another by their very nature, varying drastically
in coding protocol and, consequently, in potential end-uses, transferability,
147. United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
148. See Valencia, 2003 WL 23174749 at *1, 4 (holding that natural gas is a
commodity because at least some of it underlies a DCM and, by its very nature, natural
gas is a fungible good); Natural Gas Cases, supra note 119 (finding the same).
149. See Valencia, 2003 WL 23174749 at *8.
150. See supra Section II.C (noting distinctions between popular networks).
151. See Valencia, 2003 WL 23174749 at *8 (articulating, first, the meaning of
"fungible," which natural gas clearly is); see also Legal Alert: Virtual Currencies as
Commodities CFTC Wins Battle in the Fight to Define Cryptocurrencies as
Commodities but Has it Won the War?, EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://us.eversheds-sutherland.com/NewsCommentary/Legal-Alerts/214772/Legal-
Alert-Virtual-currencies-as-commoditiesCFTC-wins-battle-in-the-fight-to-define-
cryptocurrencies-as-commodities-buthas-it-won-the-war ("A finding that 'gas is gas' as
a commodity category may not be an appropriate analogy when applied to all crypto-
asset tokens that do not have characteristics that are common with Bitcoin.") [hereinafter
Virtual Currencies as Commodities].
152. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm'nv. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213,
227 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 694-95 (5th Cir.
2012) ("' [I]t would be peculiar that natural gas at another hub is not a commodity, but
suddenly becomes a commodity solely on the basis that it passes through [a hub], and
ceases to be a commodity once it moves onto some other locale . . . . [T]he actual nature
of the 'good' does not change."')); United States v. Futch, 278 F. App'x 387, 395 (5th
Cir. 2008): Valencia. 2003 WL 23174749 at *26-28.
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accessibility, and investment-earning potential.153  Moreover, Bitcoin is
currently the only virtual currency that serves as a DCM-underlier, which
can (as a result) be directly regulated under CEA § la(9).15' Accordingly,
the CFTC's basis for deeming Bitcoin a commodity - its DCM-underlier
status - does not broadly extend to other entirely distinct networks simply
because they fall under the incredibly broad "virtual currency" umbrella. 5 5
Even assuming that (1) the mere possibility of a virtual currency
underlying a DCM in the future - i.e. it has monetary value - is sufficient
for commodity status, and (2) "virtual currency" is an acceptable product
category, several networks could still never be commodities within § 1 (a)(9)
definition.' 56 The most demonstrative examples mentioned in this Comment
are KSI, R3, and other information blockchain networks that, by design,
could never underly a DCM (or any other derivative, for that matter).
Unlike Bitcoin-class, Smart-contract, and Ripple-class networks,
information blockchains are neither convertible nor freely-transferable, and
therefore have no real-world value, either monetary or otherwise. '" Given
that the very existence and value of a derivative fundamentally relies on an
underlying-asset's real-word monetary value, information blockchains are
153. See, e.g., Harm, supra note 33, at 3-6 (explaining coding protocol and end-use
distinctions between Bitcoin and Ethereum). Though My Big Coin found otherwise, it
considered a motion to dismiss and was therefore required to accept the CFTC's factual
allegation - that Bitcoin and the network at issue are fungible - as true. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 492 (D. Mass.
2018); see also Virtual Currencies as Commodities, supra note 151 (noting My Big
Coin's standard of review, and that "the definition of virtual currency that it relied on
was provided '[flor the purposes of the complaint at issue.") (alteration in original).
154. See supra Section IV.A.
155. See Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457, 460 (D. Md. 2015)
(defining "virtual currency"); see also Virtual Currencies as Commodities, supra note
151 ("When it comes to the thousand or more different crypto-asset tokens in circulation,
it is not so clear that they all function ... in the nature and category of Bitcoin."); cf
David L. Beam et al., Court Finds That Virtual Currency Is A Commodity For The
Time Being, MAYER BROWN (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/
x/753430/Commodities+Derivatives+Stock+Exchanges/Court+Finds+That+Virtual+C
urrency+Is+a+CommodityFor+the+Time+Being (discussing an additional question
outside the scope of this comment that even if all virtual currencies were in fact fungible
would CME's delisting of Bitcoin futures, thereby removing its DCM-underlier status,
mean that Bitcoin and all other virtual currencies are no longer commodities).
156. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385 (D.D.C.
2014) (internal citation omitted) ("Derivatives are types of 'contracts deriving their value
from underlying assets."').
157. See KSI Technology Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI); The R3 Story, supra
note 47 (discussing R3); see also Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457, 465
(D. Md. 2015) (involving an in-game currency which cannot be used or transferred




simply unusable as DCM-underliers. 5 9 Accordingly, certain virtual
currencies are not - and will never be - commodities. Moreover, while
technically possible, using asset-backed networks like Tether as DCM-
underliers is outright illogical. Their value correlates directly to that of an
underlying asset (which can itself simply serve as the DCM-underlier) while
providing only greater liability, including added transaction costs and risks
of a default or cyber-intrusion, for example. 6 0
C. Does It Even Matter?
Because the CFTC enjoys broad oversight jurisdiction over futures,
swaps, and other derivatives, it may regulate virtual currency derivatives
regardless of their commodity status.' 6' Contrarily, certain provisions in the
CEA grant the CFTC authority over commodities more broadly and thus rely
specifically on a virtual currency's commodity status to regulate it.
1. Futures & Swaps
The CFTC has relatively broad regulatory authority over all transactions
involving futures, swaps, and other financial derivatives under CEA § 4,
which grants the CFTC jurisdiction over "transactions in 'contract[s] for the
purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery. "'162 Accordingly, if a
virtual currency transaction involves a futures contract, the CFTC can
regulate it regardless of whether that particular network is a commodity
under sla(9).1 63  However, one notable exception is the CEA's explicit
exclusion of cash forwards and cash or spot transactions from § 4
jurisdiction.16 4 Accordingly, where any such transaction involves a virtual
159. See Underlying Asset, supra note 138 ("Underlying assets give derivatives their
value . . . [and are] used to determine the value of the option up till expiration. The value
of the underlying asset may change . . . affecting the value of the option . ... The price
of an option or futures contract is derived from the price of an underlying asset .... ).
160. E.g., Primer on Smart Contracts, supra note 34, at 28-30 (listing risks of Smart-
contract networks, including insider manipulation, software vulnerabilities, human error
in coding protocols, and technology failures such as internet connectivity, computer
stability, and interface compatibility); Castillo, supra note 52 (discussing the collapse of
The DAO).
161. See 7 U.S.C. § la(47)(A) (2018).
162. United States v. Reliant Energy Sers., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1062 (N.D.
Cal. 2006); see also id. (noting that Section 4 of the CEA is "exclusively concerned with
futures contracts.").
163. See Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 720 F.3d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (2012)) ("[T]he Commission has regulatory jurisdiction over a wide variety of
markets in futures and derivatives, that is, contracts deriving their value from underlying
assets."); Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385 (D.D.C.
2014) (same).
164. See Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 420 F.Supp.2d at 1062.
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currency, the CEA can never assert § 4 jurisdiction - even where a
corresponding DCM market exists.'65
Swap transactions involving virtual currencies already fall within the
CFTC's jurisdiction regardless of whether they are § la(9) commodities. 66
Given that the CEA's jurisdictional grant of swap authority makes no
mention of reliance on the underlying asset's commodity status, all swaps
involving virtual currencies fall within the CFTC's jurisdiction.167
Accordingly, a virtual currency's commodity status is irrelevant to the
CFTC's swap jurisdiction over it.68
2. Interstate Commerce Jurisdiction
Certain CEA provisions grant the CFTC regulatory authority only when
the transaction involves a commodity and are therefore the most relevant to
virtual currency regulation.1 69 Arguably, the most significant role § la(9)
commodity status has in determining CFTC regulatory authority over virtual
currencies under CEA § 13(a)(2), which grants the CFTC broad enforcement
power over cases involving price manipulation of any commodity in
interstate commerce.1o This authority is also well-supported by case law,
some of which has even expanded § 13(a)(2) to an arguably unreasonable
degree.' 7 ' Because § 13(a)(2) jurisdiction fundamentally relies on a
165. Of course, in such a case, and notwithstanding additional complications, the
CFTC would likely have an incredibly strong claim to § la(9) jurisdiction and could
avoid § 4 entirely. See supra Section IVA. 1.
166. See §§ la(47)(A), 2(a)(1)(A).
167. See Aron & Jones, supra note 71, at 6 (providing and analyzing examples of
language in the 7 U.S.C. § la(47)(A) that disregards an underlying asset's commodity
status for CFTC swap jurisdiction); 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (underscoring the CFTC's
swap jurisdiction over all virtual currency swaps).
168. § 2(a)(1)(A); See Aron & Jones, supra note 71, at 6.
169. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(b); Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
170. See Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 ("Although certain
provisions of the CEA are concerned exclusively with transactions in futures . .. other
provisions, including those dealing with price manipulation, are not so limited in scope.")
(internal citation omitted); 7 U.S.C. § 2(b) ("[A] transaction in respect to any article shall
be considered to be in interstate commerce if such article is . . . sent from one State, with
the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another .... ).
171. See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst. v. CFTC, 720 F.3d 370, 372 (D.D.C. 2013); Sec. Indus.
& Fin. Mkts. Ass'n v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385 (D.D.C. 2014); Reliant Energy
Servs., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1062; see also Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v.
McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing 7 U.S.C. §§ 6(C), 9(1);
17 C.F.R. § 180.1) (finding that the CEA grants CFTC unfettered jurisdiction over any
commodity in interstate commerce regardless of DCM-underlier status or price-
manipulation); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. My Big Coin, 334 F. Supp. 3d
492, 498 (D. Mass. 2018) (rejecting that CFTC § 6(c)(1) anti-fraud authority requires
allegations of market manipulation). But see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
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commodity's presence in interstate commerce, and most (if not all) virtual
currencies rely on internet connectivity for transferability, 7 2 deeming a
particular virtual currency a § la(9) commodity would allow the CFTC to
bring enforcement actions in cases with alleged price manipulation and - if
the current trend of expanding § 13(a)(2) beyond price manipulation
continues - potentially even those without it.1 73
3. Retail Jurisdiction & Exempt Commodities
Classifying virtual currencies as commodities would extend CFTC
jurisdiction to leveraged or margined retail transactions not involving
eligible contract participants or commercial entities, barring any exceptions
under § 2(h)(4).174 However, the Coinflip Order strongly implies the agency
will treat virtual currencies as "exempt commodities" 75 because it
considered whether offerings at issue satisfied the Trade Option exemption
under CFTC Rule 32.3 (which applies only to exempt commodities), and not
as "excluded commodities" (which include currencies and exchange rates) 7 1
because it stated that virtual currencies are not "real currency."" Most
notable here is that this classification would preclude CFTC jurisdiction in
certain situations unless it asserts that jurisdiction under § 1(a)(9) because,
Monex Credit Co., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (arguing that McDonnell
erroneously applied § 6(c)(1), which "the CEA unambiguously forecloses ... in the
absence of actual or potential market manipulation" and finding that "the only plausible
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank amendments mandates that § 4b alone prohibits fraud
and deceptive conduct, [and] § 6(c)(1) prohibits fraud-based manipulation.").
172. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Computer
Fraud & Abuse Act ("CFAA"), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (2012)) (holding that the CFAA's
statutory definition of computers as those "used in or affecting interstate foreign
commerce" includes any computers connected to the world wide web).
173. See Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
174. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text; see also Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Yorkshire Grp., Inc., No. 13-CV-5323, 2016 WL 8256380, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2016) (interpreting § la and finding valid CFTC retail jurisdiction).
175. See 7 U.S.C. § la(20) (defining "exempt commodity" as one that is not an
"excluded" or agricultural commodity).
176. See id. § la(19) (defining "excluded commodity" as an interest rate, exchange
rate, or currency, inter alia).
177. In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 15-29, at *1, 2 n.2 (Sept. 17, 2015); see
also FrequentlyAsked Questions on Virtual Currency and CFTC Jurisdiction, SKADDEN,
ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 1, 3 (2017), https://www.skadden.com/insights/
publications/2017/1 1/faqs-on-virtual-currency-and-cftc-jurisdiction (discussing the
CFTC's implied classification of virtual currencies as exempt as opposed to excluded
commodities); Editor, Show Me the Money, 35 No. 11 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP.
1, 1 (2015) (arguing that the Coinflip Order demonstrates the CFTC's placing virtual
currencies "in the same regulatory category as precious metals rather than as legal tender
currencies or financial instruments").
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as discussed, § 2(h)(3) specifically excludes transactions in exempt
commodities entered into directly between eligible commercial entities and
executed through an electronic trade facility. Accordingly, so long as a
virtual currency transaction is entered into by such entities, does not involve
an indirect transaction - such as one involving financial derivative, for
example - and is executed on an electronic trading facility, its exempt
commodity classification excludes it from CFTC jurisdiction.1 79
V. WHY MCDONNELL GOT IT WRONG
The central issues with McDonnell's holding - that all virtual currencies
are commodities subject to CFTC jurisdiction - appear to result entirely
from the court's (understandably) weak comprehension of an emerging
technology, its nuances, and relevant technical definitions. Specifically,
McDonnell's holding is erroneous because the court (1) relied on and
misapplied inadequate factual authorities that failed to account for nuances
important to regulatory classification, and (2) oversimplified, and thereby
misinterpreted, case law regarding commodities regulation more broadly.
A. Misapplied Facts
1. Erroneous Reliance on Dictionary Definitions
Due to its reliance on insufficient factual authorities that provide broad
definitions of important technical terms, McDonnell overgeneralized and
misapplied the facts at issue as well as the definition and scope of the term
"virtual currency."iso First and most concerning is the court's reliance on
factual sources that, while certainly reliable, were clearly neither intended
nor claimed to account for the specific nuances of virtual currencies or
provide the in-depth understanding of these products required for an accurate
legal analysis and regulatory classification of any emerging technological
product."" Rather than sufficiently identify the precise facts, terms, and
technical distinctions at issue, the court relied on just two sources: one
classified as a "general-purpose dictionary," designed to provide a "complete
inventory of a language" and word-use,82 and another designed to "provide
178. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
179. See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Barclays Bank PLC, 105 F. Supp. 3d
1121, 1144-45 (E.D. Cal. 2015), as amended (May 22, 2015) ("'Markets that satisfy the
initial and ongoing requirements of section 2(h)(3) ... are excluded from the Act's other
requirements."') (internal citation omitted).
180. KEY DEFINITIONS, supra note 2, at 4 (defining "virtual currency").
181. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing McDonnell's reliance on
dictionary definitions).
182. Dictionary, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
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definitions of words in their legal sense," rather than serve as factual bases
for properly understanding the actual nature of complex new technologies.183
Therefore, while a court may certainly employ dictionaries and similar
sources for determining precise definitions to operative terms in cases
involving complex financial and technological products (just as this
Comment does in the following section), 4 these operative terms must first
be identified and properly contextualized by reference to more topic-specific
sources with specialized, in-depth knowledge of the issue at hand (such as a
treatise, for example).
Moreover, the court's reliance on dictionary definitions is misplaced
because the court erroneously overgeneralizes all virtual currencies as
"articles of trade or commerce" or "economic goods." 85  While certain
virtual currencies like Bitcoin-class, Smart-contract, and Ripple-class
networks are well-within these definitions because they are convertible,
others like information blockchains are not."' Following McDonnell's own
reasoning by applying Black's Law Dictionary's definitions, information
blockchains are not articles of "trade" or "commerce" because they do not
involve barters, purchases, sales, or exchanges in any form, between
individuals or otherwise.18 7 Nor are they "economic goods" under Merriam
Webster's definition because they cannot "be paid for," as it explicitly
requires." Moreover, employing these definitions as a legal basis for
regulating a novel, complex product is generally concerning because, in
dictionary/Kinds-of-dictionaries#ref3 1967 (last visited May 15, 2019) (referencing kinds
of dictionaries).
183. Shameema Rahman, Using Secondary Legal Resources to Locate Primary
Sources, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (June 18, 2012), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2012/06/
using-secondary-legal-resources-to-locate-primary-sources/.
184. See infra note 212.
185. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm'nv. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213,
224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
186. See KEY DEFINITIONS, supra note 2, at 4 (defining convertible currencies); KSJ
Technology Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI).
187. See Trade, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (1Oth ed. 2014) (defining "trade" as "[t[he
act or business of exchanging commodities by barter; or the business of buying and
selling for money; traffic; barter."); see also Commerce, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (defining "commerce" as "[i]ntercourse by way of trade and traffic
between different peoples or states and the citizens or inhabitants thereof, including not
only the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities, but also the instrumentalities and
agencies by which it is promoted and the means and appliances by which it is carried on,
and the transportation of persons as well as of goods . . . ."); see also KSJ Technology
Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI).
188. See Economic Good, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (defining an "economic good" as "a
commodity or service that is useful to man but that must be paid for - usually used in
plural."), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/economic%"20good (last visited
May 15, 2018); KSJ Technology Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI).
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addition to the generalized nature of these sources, Black's Law Dictionary's
definitions of "commodity" relies on the words "trade" and "commerce," and
vice versa.18 9 Accordingly, relying on definitions which depend directly on
one another for determining regulatory jurisdiction (or as the primary basis
of a federal court opinion on any matter of first impression, for that matter)
directly employs circular reasoning and is legally unsound.190
2. Misinterpreted Legal Commentary
McDonnell appears to have applied the attributes of just one virtual
currency, the Bitcoin Network, to all virtual currencies, generally.191 This is
most apparent in the only reasoning other than the definitions discussed
above that the court provides for deeming virtual currencies commodities.192
McDonnell reasons that virtual currencies should be deemed commodities
due to their common usage for monetary exchange and ability to store
value.1 93 However, the court supports these assumptions exclusively with
legal commentary regarding Bitcoin, specifically, rather than all virtual
currencies or even the narrower cryptocurrency subset.1 94 Even assuming
that these commentators are accurate and Bitcoin is a commodity (as is likely
the case), the court failed to provide any sound reasoning or legal basis for
extending commodity status to virtual currencies, broadly. 195
Further, McDonnell's relied-upon legal commentaries that contradict its
holding in-part and, regardless, are not sufficiently accurate enough to serve
as a factual basis for deciding precedential (and undeniably consequential)
legal issues. First, one cited commentator opines that Bitcoin should be
regulated as a commodity because the term is "generally defined as 'goods
sold in the market with a quality and value uniform throughout the
world' . . . . [Which] realistically reflects the economic behavior of Bitcoin
users." 96 However, the price of Bitcoin varies dramatically between
189. See Trade, supra note 186; see also Commerce, supra note 186.
190. See generally Circular Reasoning, LOGICALLY FALLACIOUS, https://
www.logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/66/Circular-Reasoning (last
visited Oct. 1, 2018) (discussing circular reasoning by providing descriptions, examples,
and explanations).
191. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm'nv. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213,





196. See Mitchell Prentis, Digital Metal: Regulating Bitcoin As A Commodity, 66
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 609. 626 (2015).
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countries and even individual exchanges within one country.197 Therefore,
even if McDonnell had properly distinguished Bitcoin from other virtual
currencies, relying exclusively on the cited legal commentary would still
yield an inaccurate analysis of the facts at issue.' 98  Moreover, one
commentator defines a commodity as any item that assists with storing value
before applying this definition to Bitcoin and then emphasizes that, "in
contrast, a security is any instrument that is 'secured' against something
else." 199 Accordingly, under McDonnell's own factual basis, asset-backed
tokens like Tether's USDT, are securities and, in contrast, not commodities.
B. Misapplied Law
McDonnell oversimplified and resultingly misapplied the law regarding
the legal commodities classification. Specifically, the court erred in
disregarding a central, unresolved question in commodities regulation: does
the commodity classification apply only to current DCM-underliers, or to
any product capable of underlying a DCM in the future? 200 While courts
may rationally consider classifying goods with generally fungible
characteristics - such as natural gas, for example - as commodities
without an established resolution to this question, this approach is entirely
implausible when applied to non-fungible products.201' Given that Bitcoin is
currently the only virtual currency serving as a DCM-underlier and is thus a
commodity under Board of Trade and its progeny, this is a particularly
fundamental question in virtual currency classification and McDonnell's
ultimate holding.202 However, as discussed, certain virtual currencies could
never serve as a DCM-underlier and are therefore entirely inapplicable to the
court's reasoning. 2 03 Because McDonnell overlooks this issue, a reasonable
assumption is that the court erroneously overgeneralized all virtual
currencies as sufficiently similar (if not entirely interchangeable) to regulate
197. See Pisani & Haselton, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
198. But see United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 694-95 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding
that natural gas is still a commodity regardless of its location because "[w]hile the price
of that commodity may fluctuate with its location, and the forces of supply and demand
at that location, the actual nature of the "good" does not change).
199. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm'nv. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213,
224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
200. See Brooks, 681 F.3d at 695 n.l.
201. See discussion cited infra Section III.B.3 (underscoring the non-fungible nature
of virtual currencies with comparison to natural gas).
202. See McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 224-28 (describing how the court determined
that Bitcoin should be considered a commodity because of how users utilize it as money).
203. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385 (D.D.C.
2014); see also Underlying Asset, supra note 138 (describing the nature of underlying
assets).
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all virtual currencies as commodities based on Bitcoin's DCM-underlier
status.
Notably, McDonnell's sweeping decision presents some surprising, likely
unintended legal consequences. 204  For example, given the existence of
housing futures and freight-based derivatives, McDonnell's reasoning
theoretically permits CFTC actions against real-estate brokers and shipping
companies simply by alleging some form of fraud against their customers.205
The CFTC could argue that, as DCM-underliers, housing and freight
transactions are commodities under § la(9), and therefore any fraud
involving these commodities is actionable under § 6(c)(1). Moreover, given
that McDonnell's interpretation of § 6(c)(1) removes the requirement of an
existing futures contract, 2 06 the CFTC could rely on its reasoning to bring
enforcement actions against any services on which DCM markets exist, such
as legal services, for example.207
VI. So, ARE THEY SECURTMES?
Several major cryptocurrencies, as well as DAOs, likely fall well within
the legal definition of "security" - or, more precisely, "investment contract"
- and thus within the regulatory purview of the SEC regardless of their
commodity status. 2 08 This is because all convertible cryptocurrencies, such
as Bitcoin-class and Smart-contract networks, which investors currently
employ almost exactly as they do conventional public stocks and other
investment vehicles well-within SEC jurisdiction, likely satisfy all four
Howey factors. 20 9 However, applying Howey to other categories of virtual
currency requires more nuanced analyses and demonstrates that certain
networks - such as information blockchains, for example - are not
securities.
Notably, if all virtual currencies, or even just convertible cryptocurrencies,
specifically, are categorically deemed securities within SEC jurisdiction,




208. Because the issue of regulating crypto-funds other than the DAO, which function
as conventional investment funds while investing in cryptocurrencies, relies on settling
the commodities and securities classification issues analyzed here, it is outside the scope
of this Comment. See generally Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of
the Crypto Hedge Fund: Operational Issues and Best Practices for an Emergent
Investment Industry, 23 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 112 (2018) (arguing for a new regulatory
scheme for crypto-funds).
209. See White, supra note 28 (describing speculative Bitcoin trading as similar to
highly-volatile public stock trading).
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DAOs are almost certainly securities as well because they are simply online
crowdfunding platforms where, instead of fiat currency and submitted
products, investors are employing one convertible cryptocurrency -
Ethereum - and one non-convertible cryptocurrency - the DAO token -
to fund new projects and determine voting interests in funding emerging
cryptocurrency networks.210 Congress made it clear in 2012 that online
crowdfunding platforms, which issuers use as intermediaries in the offer and
sale of securities, are well within SEC jurisdiction in carving out the
"Crowdfunding exemption" to the Security Act 4.211
A. Investment ofMoney
1. Convertible Cryptocurrencies, Asset-backed Tokens, & DAOs
Convertible cryptocurrencies, asset-backed tokens, and DAOs likely
satisfy the first Howey factor, which requires the "investment of money,"
rather easily. 2 12 First, many networks and all convertible cryptocurrencies,
including asset-backed networks, clearly require an "investment" because
(unless gifted) they can only be obtained in exchange for some other
property of value.213 Second, while still generally clear, one question here
arises when users exchange other cryptocurrencies rather than fiat money for
tokens: are these other networks "money" as provided in Howey?2 14
However, courts have long held that this factor broadly encompasses any
210. See generally Metjahic, supra note 52 (explaining the DAO).
211. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, 293, 240,
249, 269, 274 (2018) (providing "a framework for the regulation of registered funding
portals and broker-dealers that issues are required to use as intermediaries in the offer
and sale of securities in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) [of the Securities Act]."). But see
The DAO Report, supra note 63, at 4 n.11 ("[The DAO] would not have met the
requirements of Regulation Crowdfunding . .. because, among other things, it was not a
broker-dealer or a funding portal registered with the SEC and the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority ("FINRA").").
212. See Securities Litigation: Jurisdictional Defenses, supra note 61; see also White,
supra note 28 (describing Bitcoin speculation as similar to trading highly-volatile public
stocks).
213. See Investment, BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see What is Capital,
N?, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (2d ed.) (defining "capital," "with respect to the
property of individuals ... [as] the property taken from other investments or uses and set
apart for an invested in the special business, and in the increase, proceeds, or
earnings .... ); see also supra Section I.B (defining "convertible" networks); Section
0-0 (explaining how users can access popular network tokens).
214. See Fiorillo, supra note 4; see also United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698,
707-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ("[B]itcoins 'clearly qualif[y] as 'money' or 'funds' .... );
Nicole Mirjanich, Comment, Digital Money: Bitcoin's Financial and Tax Future Despite
Regulatory Uncertainty, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 242 (Fall 2014) (arguing that Bitcoin
is a currency and should be regulated as such).
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exchange of value,"2 15 and the SEC has already established in court that an
investment in Bitcoin is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of Howey.216
Notably, proponents of Bitcoin-class networks generally support the SEC's
position here because it furthers the legitimacy of the overall cryptocurrency
market. 217  DAOs also satisfy the first factor because, just like those in
Howey itself, their participants invest personal capital to access them and to
ultimately up-start emerging networks.218
2. Information Blockchains
Most noteworthy, information blockchains such as KSI and R3 do not
satisfy the first Howey factor because their use does not involve an
investment of money.219 These networks do not issue tokens, and their users
cannot (lawfully, at least) convert any aspect of the virtual currency network
to fiat currency or other asset with real-world value.220 Courts would
therefore need to expand the definition of investment from "any exchange in
value" to intangible factors - such as time spent using the network or
volume of information exchanged, for example - to extend Howey's first
factor to information blockchains and other networks that do not involve an
investment of money.
B. Investment in a Common Enterprise
As mentioned above, the SEC disregards the second Howey factor in The
DAO Report entirely,221 likely because it views DAOs as clearly a "common
enterprise" under each of the terms' various legal standards,222 as well as its
215. Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1471 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560
n.12 (1979) (stating that an investment may take the form of goods and services).
216. See SEC v. Shavers, Case No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
2013) (holding that Bitcoin satisfies Howey's first prong); Fiorillo, supra note 4; see
generally Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, The Private Digital Currency,
And the Case Against its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 111 (2012) (discussing
legal considerations in classifying "virtual currency" as "money").
217. Oren, supra note 99, at 638.
218. See Metjahic, supra note 52, at 1564 (explaining that investors purchase Ether
with fiat-currency and the DAO issues each investor shares based on their individual
Ether holdings).
219. See KSI Technology Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI); The R3 Story, supra
note 47 (discussing R3).
220. See KSI Technology Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI); The R3 Story, supra
note 47 (discussing R3).
221. See The DAO Report, supra note 63, at 11 (outlining the SEC's reasoning).
222. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing the circuit split on the
definition of "common enterprise").
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common usage. 223 However, this issue is less clearly settled as a legal matter
(and, consequently, as applied to virtual currencies) than may first appear,
primarily because of the circuit split over whether it requires a showing of
horizontal or vertical commonality and, if the latter, whether it must be broad
or strict.2 24 Second, while less crucial here, it is worth noting that courts
hesitate to interpret Howey's language literally, and instead focus
specifically on the "economic reality" of the industry at issue. 2 25
1. Convertible Cryptocurrencies & DAOs
Convertible cryptocurrencies likely satisfy horizontal commonality rather
easily because their adoption by a user-base investing its personal assets in
exchange for tokens is precisely what creates, sustains, and changes their
value against fiat currencies, thereby directly tying investors' fortunes
together by their pooling of assets.226 Further, these networks likely satisfy
both broad and narrow vertical commonality inquiries as well because (1)
their success and value depend directly on the efficacy of the network's
promoter, and (2) investors' fortunes are tied to that of the promoter.227 The
Eleventh and Fifth Circuits found that investors relying on promoters'
advertisements of the investments and recruitment of others to gain a greater
return was sufficient to show "broad vertical commonality." 2 28 Given that
investors currently purchase tokens on these networks mainly to profit from
223. See, e.g., Common Enterprise, BuSINEss DICTIONARY http://www.business
dictionary.com/definition/common-enterprise.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2019) (defining
"common enterprise" in-part as requiring "common objectives", which "may be implied
by the ... sharing of profits ... [or] joint ownership").
224. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text; see also Long v. Shultz Cattle
Co., 881 F.2d 129, 140 n.11 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The Supreme Court has thus far declined
to resolve this split in authority although three justices expressed a desire to do so.").
225. Tcherepninv. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946)) ("[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the word
'security' in the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should
be on economic reality.").
226. See The Bitcoin Phenomenon: How Cryptocurrencies Gain Value, supra note 27
(discussing factors controlling cryptocurrency values); see also Revak v. SEC Reality
Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Hart v. Pulte Homes of Mich. Corp., 735
F. 2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying horizontal commonality and defining it as
"t[ying] the fortunes of each investor in a pool ... to the success of the overall
venture ... [which] requires a sharing or pooling of funds.") (internal quotation omitted).
227. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (providing the legal standards of
broad and narrow vertical commonality).
228. Oren, supra note 99, at 639 (citing Villeneuve v. Advanced Bus. Concepts Corp.,
698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (1lth Cir. 1983); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473,
479 (5th Cir. 1974)); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855
(1975) (holding that, for determining security status, "profit" can be either income from,
or capital appreciation of, an investment).
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the appreciation of their value, which in turn relies directly on the
developer's ability to successfully market the product to its intended users,
investor's reliance here is likely sufficient for broad vertical commonality. 22 9
Moreover, because developers of these networks rely on the exact same
factor - the token's open-market price - to earn a profit, their fortunes are
tied directly to that of investors, and therefore these networks likely satisfy
strict vertical commonality as well. 23 0
DAOs likely satisfy horizontal commonality because, similar to investors
in convertible cryptocurrencies, members of these funds invest personal
capital for a share of future profits from blockchain ventures successfully
funded by their pooled assets. 231 DAOs, however, may not satisfy broad
vertical commonality because the success of its members' investment in the
network depends not on the efficacy of the network's promoter, but rather on
the overall success of the blockchain projects successfully funded on
network.2 32 Accordingly, courts must decide whether only the efficacy of
the promoter of a member's primary investment - Ether purchased to access
the DAO, for example - is sufficient to satisfy broad vertical commonality,
or whether the efficacy of promoters of the member's secondary investment
- networks crowdfunded on the DAO - may suffice as well. However,
such crypto-funds likely satisfy a strict vertical commonality inquiry
because, similar to those of convertible cryptocurrencies, developers of
DAOs only profit when investors on the network successfully fund a proj ect
which generates a return on investment and dividends for those involved.
2. Information Blockchains & Asset-backed Tokens
Information blockchains and asset-backed blockchains do not satisfy
Howey's second factor because, as discussed, tokens on information
blockchains have absolutely no monetary value (if they even exist), and the
value of tokens on asset-backed networks is derived entirely from the value
229. See Fiorillo, supra note 4 (discussing Bitcoin capital appreciation); Prather,
supra note 27 (discussing impacts of market conditions on token values); White, supra
note 27 (describing speculative Bitcoin trading); Prather, supra note 28 (discussing
impacts of market conditions on token values).
230. See, e.g., Jeff Kauflin, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Crypto Billionaires' Net
Worth Falls by Billions, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jeffkauflin/20 18/03/30/here-today-gone-tomorrow-crypto-billionaires-net-worth-falls-
by-billions/ (reporting on the impact of declining Ethereum prices on its developer's net
worth).
231. See Metjahic, supra note 52 (explaining The DAO).
232. Notably, however, the argument can be made that DAOs do in fact rely on the
efficacy of their promoters because, if a promoter fails to attract a sufficient investor pool
to join a network, projects could never be successfully funded. See Metjahic, supra note
52 (explaining The DAO).
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of an underlying real-word asset.233 These networks do not satisfy horizontal
commonality simply because users do not pool assets and, therefore, their
fortunes cannot possibly be tied together by doing so. 234 Similarly, these
networks do not satisfy vertical commonality - whether broad or strict -
because neither the efficacy nor fortunes of their promoters have any bearing
on the investors' (non-existent) fortunes.235
C. Expectation of Profits
Applying Howey's third factor to virtual currency investments is
seemingly straight-forward and, accordingly, receives little attention from
regulators and courts. 236 The Supreme Court has provided that the term
"profits" in Howey refers specifically to "the profits that investors seek on
their investment, not the profits of the scheme in which they invest." 23 7
Accordingly, when investors purchase tokens of a particular convertible
cryptocurrency with the intention of earning a return on those tokens when
their value increases, their expectation of profit is sufficient to satisfy
Howey's third prong.2 38 And given that most investors currently purchase
tokens on convertible cryptocurrency networks specifically for this purpose,
these networks likely satisfy Howey's third prong. 239 Likewise, DAOs and
all other crypto-funds satisfy Howey's third prong because, similar to any
other venture capital or investment fund, members explicitly join these
ventures to profit on their investments.240
Notably, however, this Howey factor's applicability to convertible
cryptocurrencies may present regulators with one particular issue because,
in addition to speculative trading, convertible cryptocurrencies are often used
simply to transfer payments for goods or services without any expectation of
profit or return on investment. 24 ' There, users are induced to purchase tokens
233. See KSI Technology Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI); The R3 Story, supra
note 47 (discussing R3).
234. See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994); KSI Technology
Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI); The R3 Story, supra note 47 (discussing R3).
235. See Fersht, supra note 47 (discussing informationblockchains); see also The R3
Story, supra note 47.
236. See The DAO Report, supra note 63; see also Oren, supra note 99, at 639 (only
briefly discussing the third Howey factor).
237. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004) ("We used 'profits' in the sense of
income or return, to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or the
increased value of the investment.").
238. See White, supra note 27 (describing Bitcoin speculation as similar to trading
highly-volatile public stocks).
239. See id.
240. See Metjahic, supra note 52 (explaining The DAO).
241. See Fiorillo, supra note 4 (discussing Bitcoinpayment-processing).
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simply to acquire interests, goods, or services, which the Supreme Court has
long held does not invoke the applicability of securities laws.242 Contrarily,
information blockchains and asset-backed networks clearly do not satisfy
this Howey factor because their users have no expectation of profits
whatsoever, instead employing these networks to exchange information and
to move capital between other virtual networks and one another,
respectively. 243
D. Sole Efforts of Others
Despite the SEC's focus on Howey's fourth factor in The DAO Report, its
applicability to virtual currencies appears to be generally straight-forward.244
While courts are divided on exactly how much effort investors themselves
may exert or others must exert to satisfy this factor, each type of virtual
currency discussed thus far with the exception of information blockchains 245
seems to fall well-within standards which are relatively consistent across
jurisdictions.2 46
1. Asset-backed Tokens & DAOs
This is particularly apparent in applying Howey's fourth factor to asset-
backed tokens because their value may rely directly on the actions of those
entirely uninvolved in the network itself, such as a state government (when
backed by fiat currency) or a farming collective (when backed by agricultural
commodities), for example.247 Such tokens are functionally equivalent to
derivative securities, such as options - financial instruments that create
242. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975) (holding
that, despite having the term "stock" in its name, a venture was not a security because
"the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire [an interest]; it was not to invest for
profit.").
243. See KSJ Technology Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI); The R3 Story, supra
note 47 (discussing R3).
244. See The DAO Report, supra note 63, at 12-14 (focusing on Howey's fourth
factor by underscoring investors' limited voting rights and strong reliance on
cryptocurrency developers to realize profits). But see Oren, supra note 99, at 642-43
(noting and arguing against the SEC's attempts to dismiss the fourth Howey factor).
245. As discussed, information blockchains have no monetary value and therefore
users have no expectation of profits - from the sole efforts of others or otherwise. See
supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing information blockchains).
246. Compare SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 477, 482 (allowing
investors to contribute to sales activities and governance decisions), with SEC v. Life
Partners, Inc., 102 F.3d 587, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (interpreting the word "solely" to mean
"predominantly").
247. See KSJ Technology Stack, supra note 46 (discussing KSI); The R3 Story, supra
note 47 (discussing R3).
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contract rights to buy or sell underlying securities at a "strike" price 24 8  in
that they are pegged to the price of underlying assets and therefore "derive
their value" from them.24 9 Courts widely recognize that options are
securities as well as the SEC's long-held view that "transactions involving
derivative securities could be equated to the purchases and sales of the
underlying securities for the purposes of incurring liability under [the
Securities Act]" because "holding [them] is functionally equivalent to
holding the underlying security."250 There is therefore no reason to believe
that holding security derivatives involves sufficient effort by others to deem
them securities, while the same does not apply to asset-backed tokens.2 5 '
Accordingly, asset-backed tokens almost certainly satisfy Howey's fourth
factor and are well-within SEC jurisdiction when based on separately
recognized securities.
Likewise, DAOs are similar if not identical to conventional online crowd-
funding platforms, which, as discussed, fall within SEC jurisdiction where
they are used as an intermediary in the offer and sale of securities. 25 2
Accordingly, it would appear contrary to Congress's intent to find that DAOs
do not involve sufficient effort by others while other crowdfunding platforms
performing exactly the same function do. Moreover, circuit court precedent
regarding corporate partnerships strongly suggests that investor interests in
projects successfully funded on a DAO satisfy Howey's fourth factor.253
2. Convertible cryptocurrencies
The fourth Howey factor's applicability to convertible cryptocurrencies
248. See James Chen, Call Option Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/c/calloption.asp (last updated Aug. 4, 2018) (explaining call options).
249. Magma Power Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 136 F.3d 316, 321 (2d Cir. 1998); see
also id. (holding that the financial instrument at issue, which was pegged to the price of
a public stock, was a derivative security); supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text
(discussing Asset-backed tokens).
250. Rothv. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 524, 530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citing Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-28869, Investment Company Act Release No.
35-25254, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242-01, 7248 (Feb. 21, 1991)).
251. While, of course, options are used for price speculation specifically because they
require a pre-determined strike price, there is no indication that this is a dispositive factor
in their satisfaction of Howey. See Roth, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 530-31 (providing the
rationale behind deeming derivatives as falling within SEC jurisdiction).
252. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
253. SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 757 (11th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing
general partnership interests, which are presumed not to be investment contracts due to
the typically active role of general partners in managing the business, from limited
partnerships, which leave sufficiently "little power in the hands of the partner") (internal
citation omitted).
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appears similarly straight-forward. Just as traditional securities such as
common stocks, an investor's level of control over a token's price (and
therefore overall return) on a convertible cryptocurrencies' networks varies
widely based on their specific ownership status.254 Developers can
dramatically increase a token's price by upgrading the network with new
capabilities, resolving a previously concerning issue, or promoting the token
for a new purpose - functionally equivalent to a corporation releasing a
successful new product or announcing a strategic acquisition, for example. 255
Developers can also impact a token's price negatively by making changes to
the network that are unpopular with users.256 Similarly, cryptocurrency
"whales" have substantial control over a token's price - functionally
equivalent to the control and influence enjoyed by corporate majority
shareholders. 257  And in both scenarios, average investors with modest
holdings - and, in the case of cryptocurrencies, little involvement in the
greater community surrounding a network - generate their profits and
losses entirely from the sole efforts of others.258
VII. MOVING FORWARD - AN EFFECTIVE (I.E. PRECISE) REGULATORY
SCHEME
Fundamentally, McDonnell overgeneralized the function and scope of the
term "virtual currency" and extended arguments from legal commentary
regarding Bitcoin, specifically, to all virtual currencies, generally.259
254. See generally Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233
(2002) (analyzing discrepancies in stockholder control of day-to-day operations). This
issue becomes more complicated, however, when examining networks which allow self-
governance. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 35 (discussing Tezos).
255. See, e.g., Jacob Sonenshine, SEC Sues Tesla CEO Elon Musk, THESTREET (last
updated Set. 27, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/markets/the-sec-is-suing-elon-musk-
14726561 (reporting on the SEC's suit against Tesla's CEO for issuing "misleading
statements" regarding his securing financing for privatization, resulting in significant
stock-price shifts).
256. Id.; EDITORIAL TEAM, The Howey Test and Cryptocurrency: Which Coins May
Apply?, COINBUREAU (May 6, 2018), https://www.coinbureau.com/analysis/Howey-
test-cryptocurrency/.
257. See EDITORIAL TEAM, How Bitcoin Whales Can Manipulate the Price,
CoiNBUREAU (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.coinbureau.com/analysis/bitcoin-whales-
can-manipulate-price/ (discussing the ability of "whales," or those holding significant
portions of a token's global supply, to easily manipulate the overall value of that virtual
currency); see generally James Chen, Majority Shareholder, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated
July 25, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/majorityshareholder.asp
(discussing majority shareholders).
258. See EDITORIAL TEAM, supra note 255 (explaining that because their profits
depend on actions, including market-manipulation and network upgrades, by whales and
developers).
259. See supra Section IV.A.
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Moreover, McDonnell misapplied the law by erroneously extending well-
established precedent regarding fungible goods to a non-fungible field of
products while avoiding inconvenient, yet vital legal questions that remain
unsettled. 260  The holding in McDonnell that all virtual currencies are
commodities subject to CFTC jurisdiction should therefore be narrowed, if
not completely overturned, and replaced with case law that accounts for these
issues. Perhaps even more significantly, courts must resolve the numerous
outstanding legal questions that, while potentially avoidable when dealing
with other goods, are essential to determining CFTC jurisdiction over virtual
currencies.21 These include whether CEA § la(9) commodity definition
requires present or only potential DCM-underlier status, whether it should
be read broadly as a categorical rather than product-specific grant of
jurisdiction, and - most importantly - whether "virtual currency" may
serve as one such product category under the CEA.262
First, courts should limit CEA § la(9) to include only those goods that
currently serve as DCM-underliers, aligning with Congress's original intent
in first establishing the CFTC, as well as avoiding the inconceivable practical
implications of deeming anything capable of underlying a futures market (or
essentially anything with monetary value) a commodity under the CEA.263
Second, courts should uniformly establish that CEA § la(9) is a categorical
definition that encompasses fungible goods, thus enabling the CFTC to
regulate fraudulent activity undertaken by those selling products into
interstate commerce while aligning with precedent such as the Natural Gas
Cases.264 Lastly, and as noted repeatedly throughout this Comment, courts
should hold that, while Bitcoin is a commodity due to its DCM-underlier
status, the term "virtual currency" may not serve as a general product
category under § la(9) because many networks falling within it are entirely
distinct products developed for varying purposes and often countervailing
potential uses.265
Similarly, applying Howey to categories of virtual currency beyond major
cryptocurrencies, DAOs, and other crypto-funds makes clear that certain
260. See supra Section IV.B.
261. See supra Section III.B.
262. Id.
263. See 7 U.S.C. § la(9) (discussing Congress's intent and grant of jurisdiction in
establishing the CFTC); see also Hunter v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.3d
155, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ("Congress crafted CEA section 2(a)(1)(A) to give the CFTC
exclusive jurisdiction over transactions conducted on futures markets like the
NYMEX.").
264. See supra Section II.D.2 (providing factual background on the Natural Gas
Cases).
265. See supra Sections I.C, II.B, IV.
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networks, such as information blockchains, could never be securities under
existing case law and requires clarification of outstanding legal questions.266
Primarily, courts - at this junction, likely the Supreme Court - must
uniformly resolve whether an "investment in a common enterprise" may be
shown with horizontal commonality, broad vertical commonality, strict
vertical commonality, or a different standard entirely.267 SEC regulators, on
the other hand, must confront the central issue concerning the application of
securities laws to even the most popular cryptocurrencies when used
exclusively to transfer payments for goods or services without any
expectation of profit, directly in the face of Supreme Court precedent
specifically excluding such transactions in a different context. 26 8
Accordingly, perhaps the following regulatory framework, which
accounts for the technological attributes of distinct virtual currency networks
and agency jurisdiction under existing case law, may be applied in the









Regulators are often confronted with myriad of newly arising technical
nuances, existing legal questions, and long-term practical considerations
with innovative new products, goods, and services introduced into the global
marketplace and made available to the general public. However, not all (if
266. See supra Section V.
267. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
268. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975) (holding that
securities laws are not invoked when "the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire
[an interest]; it was not to invest for profit.").
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any) bring forth as substantial a need for understanding the complex,
fundamental technological underpinnings involved as the development of
DLT and related financial products such as Bitcoin, Smart-contract
networks, information blockchains, and DAOs. McDonnell's difficulty with
identifying the appropriate language and technical distinctions involved in
the broad "virtual currency" category is neither condemnable nor surprising;
courts are not and cannot possibly be subject-matter experts on even long-
standing, let alone newly emerging and highly complex technological
innovations that can act as legal contract intermediaries, internal systems of
exchange, information recording systems, monetary systems, and - in just
one specific application - financial investment products. The McDonnell
court was simply doing its job, perhaps too well, in seeking to extend
adequate legal protections for consumers to an emerging new field.
Likewise, the SEC and CFTC's attempts to expand their reach beyond
existing statutory grants ofjurisdiction and case law only further exhibit the
tenacity with which regulators seek to fulfill their role of protecting
American consumers from fraud and misconduct related to complex
financial transactions. However, the outstanding legal questions in
commodities law, related defects in McDonnell's holding, and practical
concerns in applying securities law to an innovative new product present
regulators and courts with an optimal opportunity to establish an effective,
accurate, and precise regulatory framework to govern virtual currencies.
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